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STATUTE

Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit

discrimination based on sex, among other protected traits. 1 Though oft used as a

route to litigation, Congress initially did not intend that Title VII become a
pathway to suit, but rather sought to, "encourage formal conciliation and . . .
foster vol untary compliance . . . " 2 through, "the creation of . . . [anti-harassment]
policies and effective grievance mechanisms."3 Many times amended,4 Title VII
states that employers may not:
discriminate against any individual with respect to ... compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of ... sex ...
or (2) ... limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive an

I . H.R. REP. No. 88-9 14 ( 1 964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240 1 ; Griggs v. Duke Power, 401

l' .S. 424. 429 (197 1) (noted congressional intent to promote parity in employment opportunities).
2

·

Stache v. Int'! Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, 852 F.2d 1 23 1 , 1 234 (9th Cir. 1988) .

.l Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 ( 1 998).

4. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1 , at 2 ( 1 99 1 ), reprinted in 1 99 1 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 550 (reveals that

('ongrcss sought to fortify "protections and remedies" available under Title VII); see also H.R. REP. No.

92-238. at J (197 1 ), reprinted in 1 972 U.S.C .C.A.N. 2 1 37, 2 1 39 (illuminates that Congress sought to
equip the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission with procedures necessary to counter employ
ment discrimination).
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individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's ... sex . . .

.5

The Supreme Court has illuminated that "sex" and the other traits protected by
Title VII require "modifiers" to place their meaning into context.6 M odifiers for
the term "sex" have become the basis of multitudinous suits.7 Title VII prevents
employment discrimination based on gender; the statute does not prevent normal
differences in the way that individuals of the opposite sex interact with each
other,8 nor does Title VII prevent discrimination based on "mere personal
dislike. "9
With the influx of individuals from diverse origins into the American
workplace, employment disputes between foreign workers and employers
concerning allegedly discriminatory behavior remains a distinct possibility.
Regarding undocumented workers' access to specific Title VII remedies, the
10
Ninth Circuit has determined that Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc.v. NLRB, a
Supreme Court case denying illegal immigrants back pay under the National
Labor Relations Act, does not necessarily preclude illegal immigrants from
receiving back pay under Title VII. 1 1 The Ninth Circuit posited that "the
overriding national policy against discrimination would seem likely to outweigh
any bar against the payment of back wages to unlawful immigrants in Title VII

5. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(a) (West, WESTLAW through P.L.109-2).

6. See Gen. Dynamics Land

Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 601 n.9 (2004) (illuminates the

difference between the broad definitions of traits that Title Vll protects and the relatively narrow
definition of age, the trait protected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).

7. See Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980) (concerns a female

seeking protection of black women as a subclass).
8. See Grimes v.Tex.Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 143 (5th Cir. 1996)
(court determines that plaintiff did not meet her burden of proof in showing that defendant employer
disliked her).
9. See Peters v.Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 548 (7th Cir. 2002) (in a Title VII race
case, a supervisor's comments illustrative of his dislike of the plaintiff did not demonstrate illicit motive
in decision to terminate hotel Joss prevention officer).

JO. 5 35 U.S. 137 (2002) (under the Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat.3359 (1986), undocumented workers are not eligible to receive back pay under the National Labor
Relations Act, 49 Stat.451 ( 1 935), codified at 29 U.S. C. § 153 (West, WESTLAW t roug P.L. 109-2)).
VII cases,
] I. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1066-67 (Hr�ffman does not pertam to Title

�

�

because:

!

action, while Title VII
[f]irst, the NLRA authorizes only certain lim ted privat� causes of
Second, Congress h�s
...
t
enforcemen
for
actton
of
causes
depends principally upon private
employers who engage m
punish
to
designed
remedies
with
plaintiffs
VII
Title
armed
both by the defendant and
unlawful discrimin atory acts, and to deter future discrimination
.
ent regime mc udes ...
enforcem
VII's
Title
why]
is
by all other employers . . . [which
and punitive damages . .. Third, under
traditional remedies ... [as well as] full compensatory
_
[ National Labor Relauons Board] may
the NLRA [National Labor Relations Act], the NLRB
an employer has v10lated the Act. Under
award backpay [sic] to workers when it has found that
_
n warrants a backpay [sic] award.).
violatio
y
statutor
a
r
whethe
decides
Title VII, a federal court

�
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cases." 12 The Circuit also noted that its decision corresponds with Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Enforcement Guidelines, which promote
the "settled principle that undocumented workers are covered by the federal
employment discrimination statutes."13 At least one circuit has addressed the
issue of Title VII protections for foreign nationals, holding that a foreign national
must show authorization to work in the U.S. at the time of the disputed incident to
receive Title VII protections.14
A. EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY UNDER DTLE vn
Title VII requires that employers assume vicarious liability for decision
makers. 15 However, the circuits differ in determining whether an employer must
assume liability for the discriminatory actions of individuals who influence
employment decisions, but do not make such decisions. In a decision by Judge
Posner. the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff can buttress her Title VII claim
with the prej udiced actions of an employee who is not normally a decision
makcr. but who nevertheless influences contended decisions regarding the
pl aintiff. 16 Alternatively, the Third Circuit and Fourth Circuit have held that
employers can only be liable under Title VII for actions committed by
decision-makers, not for actions by employees who "merely influence" the
contested decision.17 However, the Third and Fourth Circuits do concede that a

12.

Id.at 1069.
at 1070 (quoting from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); see EQUAL
E:vtl'I .( IYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Rescission of Enforcement Guidance on Remedies Available to
l!11tl11rn111e111ed Workers Under Federal Employment Discrimination Laws (June 27, 2003), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc-rescind.html.
14. See Chaudhry v. Mobil Oil Corp. 186 F.3d 502, 504 (4th Cir. 1999) (complainant lacking
dornmcntation rendering him qualified to work in the U.S. not entitled to invoke Title vm.
I 5. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998) ("Congress has directed federal courts
to interpret Title VII based on [tort] agency principles."). But see Kolstad v. ADA, 527 U.S. 526, 545
( 1999) (quoting Kolstad v. ADA, 139 F.3d 958, 974 (1998), vacated by 527 U.S. 526, (Tatel, J.,
dissenting) ("f l]n the punitive damages context, an employer may not be vicariously liable for the
discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the
employer's 'good-f aith efforts to comply with Title VII . ' ")).
16. See Lust v. Sealy, 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004) (defendant employee's recommendation to a
decision-maker that plaintiff be turned down for a promotion caused the plaintiff's injury, and thus
justified the lower court's finding). The Seventh Circuit did, however, hold that detennining the
rcasonahlcness of justifications provided by an employer for contested behavior, requires only a
consideration of the decision-maker's actions. Id.; cf Buie v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 503 (7th
Cir. 2004) ("We evaluate a claim of FMLA retaliation the same way that we would evaluate a claim of
retaliation under other employment statutes, such as the ADA or Title VII."); cf Maarouf v. Walker Mfg.
Co .. 210 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2000) (permitting the transfer of an employee's bias to a decision- maker
for purposes of Title VII suit when the an employee who made derogatory comments regarding plaintiff's
religion in a Title VII case influenced the decision to terminate plaintiff, a machine operator) ; accord
Krchnavy v. Limagrain Genetics Corp., 294 F.3d 871, 876-77 (7th Cir. 2002).
17. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistic Mgmt., Inc. , 354 F.3d 277, 290-91 (opinion on rehearing en
hanc) (4th Cir. 2004); accord Foster v. New Castle Area Sch. Dist., 98 Fed. Appx. 85 (3d Cir. 2004).
13. Id.
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decision-maker may not simply 'rubber stamp' other employees' decisions in
order to protect such employees from liability.18
B. SEX DISCRI MINATION UNDER TITLE VII
1. "Because of Sex"
Under Title VII, alleged illicit sex discrimination must occur "because of sex"
to be actionable.1 9 Though little legislative history is available to illuminate the
meaning of "sex",20 courts have determined that Title VII's "because of sex"
clause protects individuals from unfavorable employment terms, conditions, and
discriminatory acts based on gender.21 The clause protects both men and
women.22 Determining whether behavior prompting Title VII discrimination
claims occurs because of sex requires examining the context in which such
behavior arose, as determined by the "surrounding circumstances, expectations,
and relationships."23
The "because of sex" clause does not preclude individuals suffering from sex
discrimination imposed by members of the same sex from receiving Title VII
protections.24 In Oncale v . Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Court
indicated that Title VII protects individuals who are victims of job-related
discrimination committed by an individual of the same sex.25 However, the Court
revealed that Title VII does not necessarily provide protections for acts merely
sexual in nature.26 I n Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., which also concerned
same-sex discrimination, the Ninth Circuit held that Title VII prohibits "severe or
pervasive same-sex offensive sexual touching," because such harassment consti
tutes gender-based discrimination.27
2. Gender Stereotyping
The High Court in Price v. Waterhouse has ruled that adverse employment
actions rooted in stereotypical notions of proper comportment based on gender

1 8. Hill, 354 F.3d 277 at 290-9 1 ; see also Foster, 98 Fed. Appx. at 88.
1 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2).
20. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1 97 1 ) (provides
commentary regarding the Jack of legislative history construing the meaning of "sex" under Title Vil).
21 . See Harris v. Forklift Sys. , Inc., 5 1 0 U.S. 17, 25 ( 1 993); see also Willingham v. Macon Telegraph
Pub I' g Co., 507 F.2d 1 084, 1 091 (5th Cir. 1 975).
22. See Newport News S hip Bldg v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 ( 1983).
23. Id. at 682. ("Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and
juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex and
.
_ :, ).
conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive.
24. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1997).
25. Id.
26. See id. at 80-82.
. denied, 538 U.S. 922
27. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F . 3d 1061, 1 066 (9th Cir. 2002), cert
(2003).
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violates Title VII.28 However, Title VII prohibitions against gender stereotyping
do not necessarily preclude arguably pernicious sexual orientation stereotyping.

Numerous circuits distinguish between discrimination motivated by one's failure
to conform to stereotypical gender expectations and discrimination based on
sexual orientation, holding that Title VII prohibits the former, but does not pertain
to the latter. 29
The recurring stereotype of woman as caregiver has generated numerous
lawsuits.Jo The Court has warned that perpetuating stereotypes of women as
primary caregivers results in the persistence of such stereotypes and promotes
negative depictions of the quality of women employees.3 1 The Second Circuit
used this supposition to find that an employer's articulations that work and
motherhood are incompatible constituted gender stereotyping and served as
ev idence that the employer illicitly considered gender in an employment decision
adverse ly affecting the plaintiff.32

3. "Sex-Pl us" Other Categories
Some courts have afforded specific protections to certain gender subclasses,
among them minority women, women with children, and married women,
dubbing such classes "sex-plus."33 For a complainant to assert a sex-plus case,
s h e must proffer evidence demonstrating that individuals of the opposite sex not
possessi ng the "sex-plus" trait were treated differently than she or provide a
"crystal l ized legal theory that . .. [suggests] a viable basis for such a cause of

28. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 257 (1989) (plurality opinion) (Court rules

discriminatory treatment of woman not conforming with employer company's gender expectations

constituted behavior violating Title VII).
29. See Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); see also
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (court upholds the dismissal of the Title VII
complaint of a plaintiff allegedly subject to discrimination because of his sexual orientation, because "the
law is well settled in this circuit and in all others that have reached the question that Title VII does not
prohibit harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation.").
10. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003); see also Back v. Hastings on
Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 126 (2d Cir. 2004).
11. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
12. See Back, 365 F.3d at 126 .
11.

Compare Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980) (in

providing a remedy specifically for black women, the court reasoned that:

Ii In the absence of a clear expression by Congress that it did not intend to provide protectio n
against discrimination directed especially toward black women as a class separate and distinct
from the class of women and the class of blacks, ... [the court] cannot condone a result which
leaves black women without a viable Title VII remedy.)

and Lam v. Univ. of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551, 1162 (9th Cir. 1994), ajf'd in part, rev'd in part on other
>:rounds, 164 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 1998) (acknowledges that "[l]ike other subclasses under Title VII,
Asian women are subject to a set of stereotypes and assumptions shared neither by Asian men nor by
white women."); with Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam) (court justifies
a distinction between women with school-aged children and men with children of the same age if such
distinction is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.").
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action. '34 However, not all gender subclasses are granted Title VII protections.
_ Court for th Southern District of New York declined to protect a
The D1stnct
�
subclass even more specific than women with children, declaring that women
with children who work part time are not a Title VII protected subclass. 35
The recent surge of cases with both age and sex discrimination allegations has
spurred some to argue that courts should consider older women to be a protected
subclass.36 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania allowed a plaintiff's sex-plus
age claim to withstand judgment, asserting that because age is an "immutable
characteristic,"37 older women constitute a protected subclass. However, other
circ uit courts have yet to acknowledge the validity of a sex-plus age claim.3 8 In
fact, the Sixth Circuit declined to carve out a p rotected subclass based on sex and
age, citing the lack of support for such a theory in other circuits.39
C.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPP ORTUNITY COM MISSION REQUIREMENTS

Congress created the Equal E mployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
and charged the agency with enforcing Title VII.4° Congress initially intended
that the EEOC facilitate mediation of discrimination disputes b ased on a
plaintiff's protected class.41 The EEOC maintains a significant role in Title VIl
proceedings, because the Commission develops guidelines and issues procedures
governing claimants.42 When an EEOC-reviewed Title VII claim reaches the
courts, the EEOC's findings do not bind the courts.43 However, courts usually

34. See Higgins, 194 F.3d at 261;

see also Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1 420, 1446-47 (2d Cir.

19 95) (plaintiff college professor alleging that sex discrimination prevented her from receiving tenure did
not prevail on her sex-plus marital status claim, because she did not proffer evidence showing that
married women were treated differently than married men).
35. See Capruso v. Hartford Finan. Servs., No. 01- 4250, 2003 WL 1 872653, *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

36. See Nicole B. Porter, Sex-Plus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women Workers, 81 DENY.
U. L. REv. 79, 110 (2003) ("[V]arious literature ... supported the fact that there is not only a problem of
discrimination against older women, but also that older women are victims of more severe and more

frequent disparate treatment than older men or younger women.); see also Roberson v. Allte Info. Servs.,
373 FJd 647, 649-650 (5th Cir. 2004) (forty-eight year old male programmer alleged that hi s se� and age
m otiv ated his termination)· Read v. BT Alex Brown, Inc., 72 Fed. Appx. 112, 113 (5th Cir. 2003)
(plaintiff investment broke alleged age discrimination under the ADEA and sex discrimination under
Title VII); Capruso , 2003 WL 1872653 at *5; Tirado Arce v. Ara ark Corp., 239 F.Supp. 2d I_ 53, 164-6
�
(D.P.R. 2003), (plaintiff food worker brought claims under the Title V II and the ADEA, allegmg age an
sex discr imination motivated decision to lay the plaintiff off).
.
a
37. See Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 12 41 (D. P a . 1994) (female plaintiff, who was demed
secretarial position, constituted a member of a subclass of women over forty).

_I

�

;

38. P orter, supra note 36, at 85-86.
.
· cti ng
39. See Sherman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21086, *14 (6th Cir. 1999) (re1e
d a1so
an
n
woma
Pharmaceuti cal sales representative's content10n that she sho�Id b e protected as an older
reje cted the her age discrimination and sex discrimination claims).
·

·

·

40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) ( West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2).
41. See Stache, 852 F .2d at 1234.
4 . 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (West, WESTLAW throug P.L . 10 - )
rescmd suitable procedural
s of Title
r egulations to carry out the prov1s1on
.
(1986)
65
43. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,

�

�

;�

<i;r?c
).

...
may issue, amend or
•

622

THE G E O RGETOWN JOURNAL OF GENDER AND THE LAW

[Vol.VI:6 15

defer to such findings.44

I . Process Required When an Alleged Title VII Discrimination Victim Files
With the Equal Employment Opportunity C ommission
An employee alleging gender discrimination must exhaust state and local
admini strative remedies before filing Title VII charges with the EEOC.45 If the
alleged discriminatory practice occurred i n a location without a state or local
agency charged with handling such discriminatory claims, then the claimant must
file her claim with the EEOC within 180 days of the date when the alleged
di scri m i nation took place.46 If the alleged discrimination occurred in a state that
has a state or local agency charged with handling such claims, then the claimant
has

300 days from the date of the alleged illicit acts to file her claim. 47 EEOC

regulati ons require that a Title VII claimant provide a written statement
iden ti fying and detailing the allegedly discriminatory acts causing the claimant's
in jury and specifying why the claimant believes such acts are discriminatory.48
Though a Title VII plaintiff must exhaust state and local remedies before filing
with the EEOC, a claimant who files a Title VII charge with a state agency can
also elect to simultaneously file with the EEOC.49 The EEOC must wait until the
s tate agency has ceased actions regarding the named employer before it processes
a Title VII charge. 50 Such a charge is considered filed with the EEOC "upon the
expirat i on of

60 (or, where appropriate, 1 20) days after deferral, or upon the

termi nati on of .. . [the state] agency proceedings, or upon waiver of the . ..

I state I agency's right to exclusively process the charge, whichever is earliest."51
After a s tate agency resolves a Title VII dispute, the unsuccessful party can file
sui t in state court or, after securing a right-to-sue letter, discussed
court .52

infra,

federal

Prior employment agreements between a potential Title VII plaintiff an d her

44. See id. at 65; see also Griggs v.Duke Power Co., 4 0 1 U.S.424, 433-34 (1971).
45. 42 U. S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (West, WESTLAW through P. L. 109-2).
46. 42 U.S. C. § 2000-e-5(e)(l ) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2).
47. Id.; see generally Stepney v. Naperville Sch. Dist., 392 F.3d 236, 238 (7th Cir.2004), (citing Lever
v. Northwestern Univ., 9 79 F.2d 552, 556 (7th Cir. l 992), for an explanation regarding the application of
the continuing violation doctrine, which may permit a court to consider acts that occurred before Title VII
statute of limitations, when the plaintiff gains awareness of the discriminatory nature of the act within the
limitations periods due to repetition of the act). The continuing violation doctrine does not negate the
precept that "failure to remedy an unlawful employment action is not a discrete actionable violation." Id.
48. 29 C.F.R. § 160 l .12(b)-16.0115(b) (West , WESTLAW through 2005); see also McGoffney v.
Vigo County Div. of Family and Servs., 389 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir.2004) (affirms summary judgment in
employer's favor on plaintiff job applicant's Title VII claim, finding the "vague" language the plaintiff
used in drafting her EE OC charge "[was] insufficient to place the EEOC or the . . .[defendant employer]
on notice of the particular job applications to which she was referring.").
49. See 29 C.F.R. § 160 l .l 3(a) (West, WESTLAW through 2005).
50. 29 C.F.R. § 160 I. l 3(a) (West. WEST LAW through 2005).
51. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a) (West, WESTLAW through 2005).
52. Garcia v. Village of Mount Prospect, 360 F.3d 630, 642-43 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Simply because
federal civil-rights claims must be considered first by . ..[the state agency] ...and the EEOC in the case
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former employer can also affect her ability to bring Title VII claims. A plaintiff
submitting her claim for arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement does
not in and of itself constitute a waiver of the plaintiff's Title VII rights.53
However, a plaintiff employed by a government agency governed by a collective
bargaining agreement can either file a Title VII claim or file a grievance
procedure according to the collective bargaining agreement, but she cannot file
both.54 Additionally, if a complainant employed by a federal agency finds herself
the victim of an act that both violates Title VII and can be appealed under the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), then she can seek remedy for her
claims in a "mixed case."55 The complainant can either file a "mixed case
complaint" with the

EEOC

office governing her place of employment or file a

"mixed case appeal" directly with the MSPB."56 A mixed-case plaintiff cannot
bifurcate her claim by not including either the Title VII claim or MSPB claim in
her initial action.57
When an individual files a charge with the

EEOC,

the

EEOC

must investigate

and determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe the charge.58 In
investigating the claim's validity, the

EEOC

may access all relevant material,

which encompasses "virtually all material that might cast light on the allegations
against

an

employer as it collects evidence in investigating a Title VII claim. "59

The High Court noted that courts tend to liberally construe the statute's use of
"relevant."60 If the

EEOC

finds a lack of reasonable cause to believe a

complainant's charge, then the

EEOC

must dismiss the charge61 and inform the

of Title VII claims . . . does not mean that the circuit court cannot eventually exercise jurisdiction over

those claims, once the administrative process is completed.").

53. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974) (In explaining that a discrimination
clause under a collective bargaining agreement could not constitute a waiver of an individual's Title VII
rights, the Court determined that the validity of a waiver of an individual's Title VII rights would depend
on whether such waiver was "knowing and voluntary.").

54. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.301 (West, WESTLAW through 2005); see also Wright v. Snow, No. 02-7615,

2004 WL 1907687 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (complainant barred from bringing a charge under Title VII

concerning her Jack of advancement with her former place of employment, the IRS, because
complainant's collective bargaining agreement allows the complainant to bring discrimination claims in a
non-judicial forum). But

see

Macy v. Dalton, 853 F. Supp. 350, 355 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (citing 5 U.S.C.

§ 712I(d) and 29 C.F.R. §1613.219(b), the court relies on the cited authorities in determining that

federally employed individuals who elect to pursue statutory remedies under Title VII must exhaust

administrative remedies; similarly plaintiffs who elect a grievance procedure must exhaust such

grievance procedures before pursuing a statutory remedy).

55. Valentine-Johnson v. Roche, 386 F.3d 800, 805 (6th Cir. 2004) (a mixed case "employee must

navigate the administrative regime that governs Title VII as well as the procedures for challenging an
adverse personnel action under the Civil Service Reform Act.").

56. Id. (quoting Butler v. West, 164 F.3d 634, 638-39 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
57. See Chappell v. Chao, 388 F.3d 1373, 1378 (11th Cir. 2004).

58. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)( l ) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2).
59. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68-69 n.20 ( l 984).
60. Id.

61. See id.
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2

If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe the plaintiff's charge,then the

Comm ission will attempt to conciliate the employment dispute. 63 If the involved
parties do not resolve the disputed issues during informal conciliation, the EEOC
may provide the complainant with a right-to-sue letter,64 sue the alleged
discrim inatory employer, 65 intervene in an ongoing suit, 66or "appear as

rnrie

amicus

in a private Title VII action. "67If the EEOC elects to issue a right-to-sue

letter to the complainant, the complainant must file a complaint, in a trial court,
within ninety days of receiving the right-to-sue letter in order to bring a claim.68
The EEOC can also elect to file suit. 69 C ongress amended Title VII in

1972 to

enable the EEOC to file suit against employers and ensure that EEOC bore "the
prim ary burden of litigation. "70 Although a plaintiff can relinquish her right to
seek judicial relief under Title VII, 71 such action does not limit the EEOC's
abil ity to seek victim-specific remedies, 72 though the Supreme Court has held
that the EEOC cannot pursue relief on behalf of an alleged victim whose case has
already been adjudicated. 73 Some circuits permit the EEOC to bring suit against
an employer named in a private Title VII suit upon the private suit's termination
for other discriminatory practices violating Title VII. 74 Alternatively,the Third
Circuit has allowed the EEOC to bring a separate suit against a non-governmental

62. Su

id.

63. Sec 42 U.S.C.

64. Su 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(b) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2).
§ 2000e-5(f)(I) (West, W ESTLAW through P.L. 109-2) (in

situations in which a

daimant names a state or local government agency as the defendant, the Department of Justice is charged
with providing the claimant a right-to-sue letter).
65. See

66. See

id.
id.

67. See, Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., 481F.2d 501, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("Section 705(h) of Title

VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g), specifically authorizes EEOC attorneys to represent the Commission as a

pa11y or as amicus curiae.").
68.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2); see also Baldwin County

Welcome Cen. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (per curiam).
69. 42 U.S.C.

§

2000e-5(f)(l) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2).

70. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U . S . 318, 325 (1980).
71.

See 9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (1994); see also Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, 197 F.3d 752, 760 (5th Cir.
denied, 529 U.S. 1099 (2000) ("Following the Gilmer reasoning, most of the courts of

1999), cert.

appea !s have concluded that individual Title VII claims can be subjected to compulsory arbitration under
employees' non-collective bargaining agreements to arbitrate pursuant to the FAA.");

cf

Gilmer v.

lnlerstate/Johnson Lane, 895 F.2d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 1990) (regards the relinquishment of Age
Discrimination in Employment Act rights),

aff'd, 500 U.S. 20 (1991) ( "It is by now clear that statutory

daims may be the subject of an arbitr ation agreement, enforceable").
72 .
73.

See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 292 (2002).
See id. al 305 (The Court stated:

�f � court rejects the merits of a claim in a private

lawsuit brought by an employee . . . res

JUdicata bars the EEOC from recovering victim-specific relief on behalf of that employee in a
later action . . . [Additionally, to] the extent that the EEOC is seeking victim-specific relief in

court for a particular employee, it is able to obtain no more relief for that employee than the

employee could recover for himself by bringing his own lawsuit.).

74. EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1975) (The court stated:
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employer on its own behalf at any time, unhampered by preclusion restraints
imposed by a Title VII plaintiff's prior public suit concerning the same issue.75
State limitations periods do not constrain the timeframe within which the EEOC
may bring a Title VII claim.76
When the EEOC files suit, the Commission does not act as a representative of
the allegedly wronged party, but instead acts to "vindicate the public interest in
preventing employment discrimination," because the EEOC seeks to placate
interests broader than those of any one individual plaintiff.77 Several circuits
agree that a correct interpretation of Title VII precludes the EEOC from filing suit
unless the EEOC certifies that it does so in the interest of the public . 78
The EEOC can also intervene in an ongoing suit.79 Some courts hold that the
EEOC can intervene in an ongoing Title VII suit, but cannot file suit separately
once a Title VII plaintiff has filed a complaint in a trial court after receiving a
right-to sue letter.80 In addition, the EEOC can also appear as

amicus curiae in an

individual's Title VII case.81

2. Issues Regarding Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Procedural
Steps
Although the Circuits differ in their treatment regarding the necessity of
various EEOC requirements pertaining to Title VII claims, many courts have held
that the EEOC must have taken at least one procedural step, as a condition
precedent to suit subject to waiver. Courts have focused particularly two initial
steps-filing a charge and receiving a right-to-sue letter. The Supreme Court

Congress meant to avoid duplicative proceedings by limiting the EEOC to perm1ss1ve
intervention when the EEOC raises no substantially different issues and seeks no relief other
than for the private party. An entirely different situation exists when the EEOC uses the filing of
a charge simply as a jurisdictional springboard to investigate whether the employer is engaged
in any discriminatory practices; this investigation might frequently disclose, as in this instance,
illegal practices other than those listed in the charge.);
accord EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1357 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994
(1975).
75. EEOC v. North Hills Passavant Hosp., 544 F.2d 664, 667-72 (3d Cir. 1976).
76. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367-70 (imposing state statute of limitations on
the EEOC would unjustly undermine Congressional intent to enable EEOC to investigate and conciliate
claims, in light of the EEOC's expansive responsibilities).
77. Id. at 326; see also W afftehouse, Inc., 534 U.S. at 287.
78. See EEOC v. Cont'l Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1977); see also EEOC v. Harris Chemin, 10
F.3d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 2002); Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d at 1363 n.15 (6th Cir. 1975); EEOC v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 493 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir. 1974).
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)( l ) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2) ("Upon timely application,
the court may, in its discretion, permit the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a
government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, to intervene in such civil action upon
certification that the case is of general importance.").
80. See, e.g., EEOC v. Harris Cherin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1293 (7th Cir. 1993) (court sought to prevent
the EEOC from simultaneously bringing suit based on the same action as that of the Title VII plaintiff's
private suit).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4f (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2).
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declared that filing a charge with the EEOC is a step subject to "waiver, estoppel,
and equitable tolling."82 Equitable tolling provides protections for minor
claimants who have not filed a complaint until the young claimants reach legal
age and for claimants who have not filed a complaint when they are not in the
jurisdiction of the alleged discrimination .83 Many circuits have held that receipt
of a right-to-sue letter is "a precondition [of suit] subject to waiver, estoppel, and
equitable tolling."84 A plethora of rationales underlie this widely-held holding.
Some courts herald the sensibility of applying the S upreme Court's holding in
Zipes, "that the timely filing of an EEOC c harge is not jurisdictional," to hold to
all Title VII requirements listed in 2000e-5(f)( l ), are "nonjurisdictional . . . [and]
thus subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling."85 Other courts reason that
"because a timely filing with the EEOC necessarily precedes the return of a
right-to-sue [ letter] from the EEOC, such [a letter] must also be [a condition
precedent that is] curable. "86 The sheer force of precedent from persuasive courts
also serves as a motivating factor in treating a right-to-sue letter as a condition
precedent to suit.87
Concerning other EEOC requirements, the Eleventh Circuit has declared that
the proper naming of a party in an EEOC charge and right-to-sue letter, the
timeliness of the EEOC charge, and whether an EEOC charge filed by one party
can be used by the non-filing plaintiffs, are all condition precedents subject to
estoppel.88 Later, the circuit expanded its already expansive view by stating that
"all Title VII procedural requirements to suit are henceforth to be viewed as
conditions precedent to suit rather than as j urisdictional requirements."89 On
behalf of the Second Circuit, Judge Calebresi has noted that "when . . . decisions
have turned on the question of whether proper administrative exhaustion is a
jurisdictional prerequisite rather than a waivable condition precedent to bringing
suit, . . . [the court has] consistently chosen the latter approach."90

82. Zipes v. Trans World A irlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 ( 1 982).

83. Young v. U.S., 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002).
84. Rivers v. Barberton Bd. of Educ., 1 4 3 F.3d 1 0 2 9, 1 0 3 1 (6th Cir. 1 998) ("[I]t appears that the time
might now be r ight to join our sister circuits that have already concluded that a right-to-sue letter is

merely a condition precedent, and not a jurisdictional requirement, to bringing a Title VII action."); see

also F orehand v. Florida State Hosp., 89 F.3d 1562, 1 5 6 7-69 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 996) (court notes that a plaintiff
should be free to make an early request for a r ight-to-sue letter upon the assumption that the EEOC will
perform as contemplated in the regulations by issuing the letter only if it is probable that it will be unab le
to complete the administrative processing within the 1 80 day time limitation); McKinnon v. Kwong Wash
Rest.. 83 F. 3d 498, 505 ( 1st Cir. 1 996); Puckett v. Tenn. Eastman Co., 889F.2d 148 1 , 1487 (6th Cir.
1989 ): P inkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1 2 1 1 , 1 2 1 7 (5th Cir. 1 982) (per curiarn) ("[T]he receipt of a

right-to-sue letter . . . is a condition precedent subject t o equitable modification.").
85. See, e.g., McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Rest., 83 F.3d 498, 505 ( 1 st Cir. 1 996).
86. Jones v. Am. State Bank, 857 F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 1 988),

87. See Rivers, 1 43 F.3d at 1032.

cited in Rivers, 143F.3d at 1032.

88. Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R . R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1 005-08 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 982).
89. Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 7 1 3 F.2d 1 5 18, 1 525 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1983).
90. Francis v. City of N.Y., 235 F.3d 763, 768 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Butts v. N.Y. Dep't of Hous.
Pres. & Dev., 990 F.2d 1 397, 1 40 1 (2d Cir. 1 993) (The court stated:
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�itle YII plaintiffs may als� take mea�u�es to prevent courts from declaring
.
therr chums barred by res 1udzcata.
A plamt1ff seeking to bring a Title VII claim

rooted in actions buttressing a suit already brought by the p laintiff, can decrease
the likelihood of res judicata rendering her Title
claim futile. Such a plaintiff
may request that the court handling her initial claim stay the proceedings and/or
amend her initial complaint.91

VII

3. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Concerns

VII

Though the High Court has prohibited practices preventing potential Title
plaintiffs from redressing their claims, a plaintiff can relinquish or trust away her
Title
rights.92 Courts emphasize that a plaintiff must file suit within a timely
manner, and they refuse to excuse plaintiffs from the ninety day statute of
limitations for filing suit.93 The Seventh Circuit determined that a plaintiff can
also lose her rights to resort to Title
because of imprudent legal advice.94
Additionally, if a plaintiff delays in filing her claim, the l aches doctrine, which
prevents potential Title
plaintiffs from pursuing proceedings against employ
ers inordinately long after the alleged discriminatory incidents occurred,95 may

VII

VII

VII

Of course, it remains the case that exhaustion of administrative remedies through the EEOC
stands as 'an essential element of Title VII's statutory scheme, ' . . . and one with which
defendants are entitled to in sist that plaintiffs comply. Here, however, defendants neither
alleged in their answer any failure to exhaust administrative remedies nor raised any problems

with exhaustion until after judgment had been entered.).

9 1 . Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 3 1 5 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing cases from an array of
circuits, including the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits, in which the
presiding court barred plaintiff( s ) from bringing a Title VII claim when the plaintiffs "failed to take
measures to avoid preclusion under res judicata while they pursued the requisite Title VII remedies").

92. But see Alexander v. Gardner-Denner Co., 4 1 5 U.S. 36, 52 ( 1 974 ); Riley v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 881 F.2d 368, 374 (7th Cir. J 989) (court refused to examine the subjective intent of a plaintif who
waived her Title VII rights due to her lawyer's advice, holding that examining plaintiff's subjective mtent
would obstruct Title VII's purpose-settlem ent).
.
93. See, e.g., Williams v. Thomson Corp., 383 F.3d 789, 79 1 (8th Cir. 2004) (per cunam) (beca� s� t e
right-to-sue letter arrived at the most recent address plaintiff provided to the EEOC, plamttff s
explanation that she moved will not prevent dismissal of plaintiff's claims, for plaintiff failed to fulfill her
duty to infonn EEOC of her address change). But see Everson v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 2 1 6 F. Supp. 2d
7 1 (E.D.N . Y. 2002).
.
94. See Riley 88 1 F.2d at 374 ("The fact that plaintiff's counsel may have maccuratel y �onveyed the
Title VII n �hts n_iay be
effect of the rel ase or
failed to draft language adequate to . protect plaintiff's
_
.
remedied through a malpractice action, but not through JUd 1cta1 mterpretau·on of plainttff s subjective
intent. ").

�

�

·

�

·

95. Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S.

·

IO I ,

·

·

·

1 2 1 (2002) (The Court stated:

. h b ars a P1am
· tt"ff from maintaining a suit if he
[A]n employer may raise a !aches defense, w hic
[ A aches defen
defendant
the
unreasonably delays i n filin g a suit and as a result harms
'requires proof of ( ! ) lack of diligenc e by the party against whom the defense 1s asserted, a
(2) prejudice to the party as serting the defense . '
·

·

·

�

�
J

(quoting Kansas
Costello v . United States, 365 U . S . 265,
v. Colorado, 5 1 4 U . S . 673, 6 8 7 ( 1 995) (quoting
282 ( 1 961))).
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preclude the plaintiff from filing her claim.96 The Eighth Circuit distinguished
between situations out of the plaintiff's control causing plaintiff to miss the
statute of limitations for filing suit, and situations in which a court dismisses
plaintiff's claim because of plaintiff's failure to adhere to administrative
procedures, holding that equitable tolling provides refuge only for plaintiffs in
the former situation.97
A Title VII plaintiff can also waive her right to bring a Title VII action under a
voluntary settlement.98 However, the circuits utilize different approaches in
determining the validity of such waivers. The Second and Third Circuits consider
the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a plaintiff signed a
contract relinquishing Title VII rights "knowingly and voluntarily."99 Alterna
ti vely, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits refuse to consider a waiving party's
subjective intent absent fraud or duress; both courts seek to maintain the

S m i th v. Caterpillar, 338 F.3d 730, 734-735 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's ruling
doctrine barred plaintiff's Title VII claim when the plaintiff initially pursued her Title VII
l·lairn with a stale agency charged with handling such claims and then commenced proceedings with the
EEOC' nearly seven years later at the earliest. The court determined that "[t]he longer the plaintiff delays
in fi l i ng her claim, the less prejudice the defendant must show in order to defend laches."). Compare
Hrown v. Kansas Cty. Power & Light Co., 267 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 200 1) (affirms district court's
holding that pl ai nt iff 's Title VII suit was barred by )aches, because plaintiff, who brought suit more than
six years after she filed EEOC charges, delayed in bringing suit, and the district court did not abuse its
dis<.:rclion i n determining that such delay "was neither reasonable nor excusable,"), with Davis v.
P;rnasonic Co. USA, No. 02- 143 1 , 2002 WL 3 1 4 15726 (N.D. III. 2002) (the court determined that the
n i ncly-day time limitation did not toll, because neither the plaintiff nor the plaintiff's attorney received
the req u i site right-to-sue letter, and the plaintiff would have timely filed suit if plaintiff had received the
right-to-sue letter).
97. Heideman v. PFL, Inc., 904 F.2d 1 262, 1 266 (8th Cir. 1990).
98. See Alexander, 4 1 5 U.S. at 52.
99. See Bormann v. AT & T Communications, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting EEOC v.
Am. Express Publ'g Corp., 68 1 F. Supp. 216, 2 1 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (factors useful in deciding whether a
re l ease of Title VII Rights include:
96. See

th at the laches

I ) the plaintiff's education and business experience, 2) the amount of time the plaintiff had
possession of or access to the agreement before signing it, 3) the role of plaintiff in deciding the
terms of the agreement, 4) the clarity of the agreement, 5) whether the plaintiff was represented
by or consulted with an attorney, and 6) whether the consideration given in exchange for the
waiver exceeds employee benefits to which the employee was already entitled by contract or
law' . . . [and] whether an employer encourages or discourages an employee to consult an
attorney.));
cf Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 5 14, 522 (3d Cir. 1988) (court applies a Title VII analysis in an
ADEA case, and avers that:

Ii In Title VII cases, the determination of whether a waiver has been 'knowingly and willfully'
made has been predicated upon an evaluation of several indicia arising from the circumstances
and conditions under which the release was executed . . . . In light of the strong policy concerns
to eradicate discrimination in employment, a review of the totality of the circumstances,
considerate of the particular individual who has executed the release, is also necessary.).
But see A lexander, 4 1 5 U.S. at 52 (a court would have to assess whether a waiver was voluntary and
knowing; the Court did not determine whether a court making such a determination would consider
subjective factors).
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contract's sanctity. 1 00 In emphasizing a plaintiff's adherence to procedural
requirements and allowing plaintiffs to voluntarily waive their Title VII rights,
courts do not wish to divest plaintiffs of those protections.
Significant litigation has arisen from businesses' efforts to reduce liability in
Title VII discrimination cases. 1 01 Cognizance of successor liability cases, in
which a defendant employer transfers ownership and the new owner objects to
the potential liability incurred, 1 02 and integrated enterprise cases, which involve
"separate entities [that] constitute . . . a single employer," 1 03 may prove particu
larly relevant in today 's merger-laden business atmosphere. Plaintiffs filing Title
VII claims often do not participate in negotiations motivating such transfers of
employer ownership, and accordingly are disadvantaged when such transfers
occur. 104 Several circuits have upheld the successor liability doctrine with respect
to employment discrimination cases, albeit with different approaches. The Ninth
Circuit has outlined a three-factor test for determining successor liability
applicability when an employer's assets are transferred, a test also used by the
Third Circuit. 105 Alternatively, the Seventh Circuit has carved out a different
LOO. See Pilon v. Univ. of Minnesota, 7 10 F.2d 466, 468 (8th Cir. 1 983). A plaintiff graduate student's
settlement agreement to waive her Title VII rights constituted an adequate release; thus the court refused
to inquire into the plaintiff's subjective intent, because the plaintiff had legal representation throughout
the process and signed a negotiation agreement; accordingly, there was no evidence of fraud or duress.
Plaintiff's waiver of Title VII rights applied, because plaintiff's attorney negotiated the unambiguous
waiver. See id. ; see also Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 199 1 ) (court dismissed
plaintiff's Title VII claim, though the plaintiff business executive admittedly did not understand terms of
a waiver of his Title VII rights and the plaintiff's legal "representation was indirect and the release was
not negotiated." The court did not want to subjugate Title VII's settlement goals by allowing the plaintiff
to avoid unfavorable results of his agreed upon settlement.).
101. See Morelli v. Cede!, 1 4 1 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1998) (U.S. branches of foreign businesses can be
held liable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
102. See Brzozowski v. Corr. Physician Servs., 360 F.3d 1 73, 1 80-81 (3d Cir. 2004) (Title VII plaintiff
was permitted to bring Title VII charges against the defendant, because the plaintiff named all the
defendants of whom she knew at the time of filing her Title VII charge and the court refused to encourage
"evasion through corporate transfers that would frustrate the equitable power of the Court to make the
plaintiff whole.").
103. See Sandoval v. Boulder Reg'! Communications Ctr., 388 F.3d 1 3 12, 1322 ( 1 0th Cir. 2004)
(citing Bristol v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Clear Creek, 3 1 2 F.3d 1 2 1 3, 1 220 (10th Cir.
2002) (factors weighed in determining "whether two nominally separate entities constitute a . . . single
employer [for Title VII purposes include]: ( 1 ) interrelations of operations; (2) common management; (3)
centralized control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership and financial control.")).
104. Cf John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 ( 1 964) (in a case concerning collective
bargaining, the Court stated:
[e]mployees, and the union which represents them, ordinarily do not take part in negotiations
leading to a change in corporate ownership . . . [Thus, the] negotiations will ordinarily not
concern the well-being of the employees, whose advantage or disadvantage, potentially great,
will inevitably be incidental to the main considerations.).
105. See Criswell v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 1 093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1989) ("In an employment
discrimination action, there are three principal factors relating to successor liability: ( 1 ) continuity in
operations and work force of the successor and predecessor employers; (2) notice to the successor
employer of its predecessor's legal obligation; and (3) ability of the predecessor to provide adequate
relief directly."); see also Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 177-78 (cites the aforementioned factors considered in
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balancing test, noting that successor liability does not apply in all situations in
which employer assets change hands. 106 The Sixth Circuit has noted that Title VII
policy justifies the successor liability doctrine, but acknowledges that successor
li ability must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 1 07 For circuits that
recognize the successor liability doctrine, changed ownership of a business could
possibly shield the business from injunction under Title VII . 1 08
4. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Continued Prominence in
Title VII
The High Court has aided in maintaining the viability of the EEOC as the
mainstay of Title VII in a number of rulings. The Court has long prohibited
interpretations of Title VII that prevent potential plaintiffs lacking legal help from
filing suit. 1 09 Additionally, the Court also afforded protections to the filing of
EEOC complaints, by prohibiting employers from retaliating against plaintiffs
who ti le such complaints. 1 1 ° Further, the Court will not allow local procedural
rules to frustrate the EEOC 's purpose; the justices upheld the validity of an
EEOC Title V I I complaint arriving at a local clerk's office within the ninety day
requirement, although the complaint did not meet local filing requirements. 1 1 1
D.

REMEDIES

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 aims "to make persons whole for
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination" 1 1 2 and

determining successor liability in employment discrimination cases; explaining that "[t]he mere
substitution of a reasonable defendant for an insolvent one is not a basis for denying successor liability.").
1 06. EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 946 (7th Cir. 1 988) ( "[E]mphasis should be on balancing the
interest in sanctioning unlawful conduct and the interest in facilitating the market in corporate and other
productive assets.").
1 07. EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1091 (6th Cir. 1 974) ("Title VII per
se does not prohibit the application of the successor doctrine, but rather mandates its application. Title VII
was designed to eliminate discrimination in employment and the courts were given broad equitable
powers to eradicate the present and future effects of past discrimination.").
I 08 . Cf Miles v. Indiana, 387 F. 3d 5 9 1 , 601 (7th Cir. 2004) (Title VII racial discrimination case in
which the court affirmed the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana's findings
that the plaintiff, an African-American state trooper, is not entitled to injunctive relief when the defendant
employee, the Indiana State Police, was under a new administration).
I 09. See Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 ( 1 972) (though petitioner porter did not comply with
EEOC requirements in filing his complaint, the Court enabled Title VII proceedings to continue, holding
that doing so effects the intent of the Act and noting that the porter did not have legal assistance and the
respondent company did not show that it would be prejudiced).
1 1 0. See, e.g., Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 107 1 ( 1 0th Cir. 2004) ("EEOC complaints are
protected activity.").
1 1 1 . Loya v. Desert Sands Unified Sch. Dist., 721 F.2d 279, 281 (When a clerk refused to timely file a
Title VII plaintiff's complaint solely because the paper size did not meet the court's requirements, the
court held that plaintiff's complaint was duly filed, holding "that for purposes of the statute of limitations
the district court should regard as 'filed' a complaint which arrives in the custody of the clerk within the
statutory period but fails to conform with formal requirements in local rules.").
1 1 2. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 4 1 8 ( 1 975).
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prevent future illicit discrimination. 1 13 The 1 972 amendments to the 1964 Act
reveal that, "the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall have
authority to enforce . . . [Title VII provisions] . . . through appropriate rem
edies."1 14 Upon a favorable finding, a victorious Title VII plaintiff may receive
both equitable remedies and, as a result of the Civil Rights Act of 1 99 1 , 1 15 legal
remedies. 1 1 6
1.

Equitable Remedies

To restore Title VII plaintiffs to the position in which they
would have been absent the illegal discrimination, Congress enacted
§706(g), which allows federal courts to order that employers in violation of Title
VIl provide appropriate equitable relief. l I 7 Equitable remedies include injunc
tions, instatement/reinstatement, back and/or front pay, attorney's fees and other
equitable relief deemed necessary to make the plaintiff whole. 1 18 Courts enjoin
discriminatory behavior to both deter employers from future activities that
contravene Title VII and eliminate the results of previous discrimination. 1 1 9
"Injunctive relief is appropriate when a defendant's primary decision-makers
comprise the discriminating individuals named in the plaintiff's case."1 20
A trial court may order that a plaintiff be instated or reinstated into a position
for numerous reasons. The court may demand reinstatement to enable the
plaintiff to continue in her position absent illicit discrimination, prevent
employers' retaliatory actions when an employee asserts Title VII rights, allow
the employer to demonstrate to other employees that the employer adheres to
Title VII provisions, and protect the plaintiff from financial loss stemming from
Title VII discrimination. I 2 1 A "mixed motive" plaintiff, one subject to an adverse
employment decision motivated by other considerations in addition to illicit
discrimination, cannot receive instatement and reinstatement as remedies under
Title vn. I 22
In awarding back pay, courts seek to make prevailing plaintiffs whole and
a. ReliefAvailable.

1 1 3 . See id. at 42 1 .
l l4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 16(b) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2).
l l5. See Caviness v. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co., 105 F.3d 1 2 1 6, 1 2 1 8 (8th Cir. 1 997) (court notes that in
enacting the 1 99 1 Act, Congress enabled victorious plaintiffs to collect compensatory and punitive
damages).
1 16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)( l ) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2)
1 17. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 ( 1976).
1 18. Id.
1 19. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 1 45, 1 54 (1965).
1 20. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ilona of Hung., 1 08 F.3d 1 569, 1 579 (7th Cir. 1 997) (en bane) (citing EEOC v.
_
Gurnee Inn Corp., 9 1 4 F.2d 815, 8 1 7 (7th Cir. 1 990) (finding possibility that discrimination could persist
where manager who had been aware of discriminatory conduct was still employed by the defendant)).
1 2 1 . See ROBERT BELTON & DIANNE AVERY, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 794 ( 1 999); see also
Robert Belton, Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law § 7.4 ( 1 992).
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(ii) ( West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2).

632

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF GENDER AND THE

LAW

[Vol. VI:6 1 5

prevent future illicit employment discrimination. 123 Thus, the Act enables district
courts to award back pay up to two years prior to the filing of the applicable
EEOC charge. 1 24 A plaintiff can usually receive back pay from the date of the
ill icit discriminatory action to the date of her judgment. 1 25 Some courts do not
indude time accrued in the back pay calculation, after the point at which the
6
employer would have otherwise terminated the plaintiff. 1 2 Because back pay
seeks to put a Title VII plaintiff in the position she would have been absent the
discrim inatory action, courts award the Title VII plaintiff the compensation
denied her because of the illicit practice. 1 27
In limited cases, instead of reinstating a plaintiff, a court can also award front
pay, the equivalent of the compensation a plaintiff would have received if she
1 8
were reinstated. 2 Courts have considered several factors in determining the
appropriateness of front pay, including the presence of intimidating behavior
towards the plaintiff, the effect of the illicit action on the complainant's emotional
health, and the feasibility of reinstatement in light of the employer-(former)
employee relationship . 1 29 In calculating front pay, courts can assess whether the
plaintiff met her duty to mitigate damages, would have retained employment
absent di scrimination, and/or acted with "unclean hands."130
To receive attorney's fees in a Title VII suit, a plaintiff must substantially
prevail on a "significant claim" pertaining to her suit, 1 3 1 or the court will limit the

1 2 .l See. e.f?., Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 4 1 7 F.2d 1 1 22, l l 25 (5th Cir. 1969); see also
Moysis v. OTG Datanet, 278 F.3d 8 1 9, 828 (8th Cir. 2002).
1 24 . 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(g)( l ) (West, WESTLAW through P.L.

1 09-2).

1 25. But see Gloria v. Valley Grain Prods., 72 F.3d 497, 499 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (denial of
plaintiff's appeal for back pay up to the final judgment, because plaintiff accepted the lower court's
settlement without complaint, and the court considered damages accumulating after the trial date as a

separate issue).

1 26. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub!. Co., 5 1 3 U.S. 352, 362 ( 1 995) ("The beginning

point in the trial court's formulation of a remedy should be calculation of back pay from the date of the

unlawful discharge to the date the new information
1crmina1ion] was discovered.").

[that would have resulted in complainant's

1 27. Thome v. El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1 1 3 1 , l l 36 (9th Cir. 1986).
1 28 . See, e.g., Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, 1562 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1988).
1 29 . See EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 619 ( 1 1th Cir. 2000).
1 30. See R i vera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 2004) (since there is a statutory duty to
mi1iga1e damages, courts have held that a precondition for a claim for back pay and reinstatement or front

pay under Title VII is that the plaintiff be in all manner ready, willing and legally capable of performing

ahernale work at the commencement and through the back pay period); see also Calloway v. Partners
Nat' I Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 450-5 1 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 993) (The court stated:
"For a defendant to successfully avail itself of the doctrine of unclean hands, it must satisfy two
req uirements. First, the defendant must demonstrate that the plaintiff's wrongdoing is directly
related to the claim against which it is asserted. Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.,
290 U . S . 240, 245 ( 1 933). Second, even if directly related, the plaintiff's wrongdoing does not
bar relief unless the defendant can show that it was personally injured by her conduct. Mitchell
Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 9 1 7, 1 00 ( 1 980).").

1 3 1 . See Tex. State Teachers Ass'n

v.

Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791 ( 1 989).
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award, awarding fees commensurate with the plaintiff's success on her claim. 1 32
Courts often use the lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorney's fees . 1 33
The lodestar method requires that the plaintiff show the reasonableness of the
time charged for the case and the reasonableness of the hourly rate charged. 1 34 A
court must peg plaintiff's claims as frivolous or unreasonable to award a
defendant attorney's fees. 1 35
A court may order other equitable relief. 1 36 Available equitable relief includes
affirmative action designed to counter the effects of discriminatory practices 1 37
and settlement agreements corresponding with the goals of Title VII. 1 38

Cases. The Civil Rights Act of 1 99 1 codifies Title VII
plaintiffs ' right to receive limited relief in mixed motive cases--cases where
discrimination based on Title VII protected classes constitutes at least one of the
factors motivating actions spurring a Title VII plaintiff's claim. 1 39 The 1 99 1 Act,
in relevant part, states that:
b. Mixed Motive

[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complain
ing party demonstrates that . .. sex ... was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
140
practice;
and if an individual proves a violation under section
2000e-2(m), the employer can avail itself of a limited affirmative
defense that restricts the available remedies if it demonstrates that it
would have taken the same action absent the impermissible motivating
141
factor.

In resolving a circuit split, the Supreme Court has determined that 2000 (e)-2(m)
does not require direct evidence, so a Title VII plaintiff can thus use circumstan
tial evidence in seeking relief in a mixed-motive case. 142 A plaintiff in a mixed
motive case is only entitled to declaratory relief, limited injunctive relief, and

132. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 4 6 1 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1 983).
1 33. See id. at 443.
134. See Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 1 999).
1 35. See Christiansburg Gannent Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 4 1 2, 422 ( 1 978).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2).
137. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 1 49, 166 (1 987).
138. Cf EEOC v. Astra U.S .A., Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 745 ( 1 st Cir. 1 996) (injunction affirmed against an
employer's settlement agreements preventing employees from corresponding with the EEOC, because
such a settlement would obfuscate Title VII policy).
139. See J. FRIEDMAN & G. STRICKLER, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, 986 (5th ed. 2001).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2003e-2(m) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2).
1 4 1 . 42 U.S.C. § 2003-5(g)(2)(B) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2).
142. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003) (Court determined that Cong�e� s'

definition of "demonstrates" as used in Title VII does not indicate that Title VTI plaintiffs must utihze
direct evidence to show discrimination).
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attorney 's fees/costs if the respondent can show that he would have made the
same adverse decision regarding plaintiff's employment. 143

2. Legal Remedies
Also in the 1 99 1 Act, Congress made compensatory and punitive144 damages
avai lable under Title VII in cases where an employer has intentionally
discrim inated against a plaintiff in contravention of Title VII. 145 The 1991 Act
caps the amount of legal remedies recoverable; applicable caps depend on the
employer's size. 146 The caps do not apply to relief available before the 1991
amend ment, such as back pay, front pay, and other previously available relief. 147
Additionally, if a plaintiff resides in a state without a damages cap, the plaintiff
can possibly bring the state claim in federal court to avoid the Title VII caps with
respect to the state law claim. 148 The Supreme Court has construed the 1 991 Act's
provi sion allowing the EEOC to provide appropriate remedies as permitting the
EEOC to require discriminatory federal agency employers to pay compensatory
damages to a wronged plaintiff. 149 A complainant seeking compensatory and
puniti ve damages can also elect to have her case heard by a jury. 150 Punitive
damages are only available when defendants act "with malice or reckless
indi fference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual."151 A
plainti ff cannot receive legal remedies for Title VII violations that took place
hefore Congress enacted the 1 991 Amendment. 1 52 A mixed motive plaintiff also
may not receive punitive damages if other factors motivated the disputed action
in addition to illicit discrimination. 153

143.

See 4 2 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2).

144. Kolstad v. A m . Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 ( 1 999) (section of the 1 991 Act allowing
punitive damages in Title VII cases "does not require a showing of egregious or outrageous

discrimination independent of the employer's state of mind.").

See 42 U.S.C. § 1 98 l a(a)(l ) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1 98 l a(b)(3) (West, W ESTLAW through P.L. 109-2). If defendant employer has
more than fifteen but less than I 00 employees, a plaintiff i n a Title VII intentional discrimination case can
receive up to $50,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. If the employer has 1 0 1 to 201 employees,
145.

146.

the plaintiff can receive up to

$100,000;

for an employer with 201 -500 employees, the plaintiff can

receive up to $200,000; for an employer with over

500,000, $300,000

is the maximum amount of

compensatory and punitive damages a plaintiff can receive. See

id.
147. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory
and Punitive Damages, (July 1 992), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/daroages.htrnl (last
visited Apr. 1 1 , 2005).

See Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prod., Inc., 2 1 2F.3d 493, 5 1 6 (9th Cir. 2000).
See West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 2 1 2, 223 ( 1 999).
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 1 98 l a(c) (West, W ESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2).
148.
149.

1 5 1 . 42 U.S.C.

152.

§

1 98 l a(b)( 10) (West, W ESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2).

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (West, W ESTLAW through P.L. 109-2).

1 5 3 . La ndgraf v. Usi Film P rods., 5 1 1 U.S. 244 , 285-86 ( 1 9 94).
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II. THE TITLE VII CASE
A. DISPARATE TREATMENT
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire,
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to her
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of the
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 1 5 4 It is also unlawful for
an employer to limit, segregate, or classify her employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect her status as an
employee, because of such individual 's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 155 In order to prevail on a Title VII disparate sex treatment claim, an
employee only has to establish that, but for her sex, she would have been treated
differently. 1 56 Although the employee must prove that the employer acted
intentionally, the intent does not have to be malicious. 1 57 Liability in a disparate
treatment case depends on whether the protected trait actually motivated the
employer 's decision. 1 58 Disparate treatment is one of two theories of intentional
discrimination recognized under Title VII, the other theory being one of pattern
or practice discrimination. 1 59 The Court has recognized, however, that disparate
60 Disparate
treatment is the most easily understood type of discrimination. 1
treatment was the most obvious evil Congress sought to fight against with the
1 964 Civil Rights Act. 1 6 1

passage of the

Disparate treatment claims require proof of discriminatory intent either

through direct or circumstantial evidence. 1 62 Direct evidence establishes the

154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)( l ) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2).
156. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 329 F.3d ! 076, 1 079 (9th Cir. 2004).
157. See id.
158. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003).
159. See Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 724 ( l l th Cir. 2004) , citing EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, 220
F.3d 1263, 1274 (I I th Cir. 2000) (in a "pattern and practice" disparate treatment case, the plaintiff must
prove, normally through a combination of statistics and anecdotes, that discrimination is the company's
standard operating procedure).
160. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 43 1 U.S. 324, 335 ( 1 977) (The
Court stated:
Disparate treatment such as is alleged in the present case is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.).
161. See id., citing 1 IO CONG. REC. 1 3088 ( 1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (Senator Humphrey
stated:
"What the bill does . . . is simply to make it an illegal practice to use race as a factor in denying
employment. It provides that men and women shall be employed on the basis of their
qualifications, not as Catholic citizens, not as Protestant citizens, not as Jewish citizens, not as
colored citizens, but as citizens of the United States").
162. See Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 723 (I I th Cir. 2004).
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existence of discriminatory intent behind an employment decision without
requiring any inference or presumption. 1 63 Since direct evidence involves blatant
and transparent remarks, it is encountered infrequently.1 64 Because direct
evidence of intentional discrimination rarely exists, employees have to rely on
drcumstantial evidence to prove intentional discrimination. When using circum
stantial evidence to prove intentional discrimination, plaintiffs can use the
framework established in McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green. 1 65 This analysis,
commonly known as the McDonnell Douglass burden-shifting framework,
requires a plaintiff to show: 1 ) that she belongs to the protected class; 2) that she
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; 3) that, despite her qualifications, she was rejected; and 4) that, after
her rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of plaintiff's qualifications. 1 66
The McDonnell Douglass test is the predominant form of pretext jurispru
dence. The three parts of the test are: 1 ) the establishment of a prima facie case, 2)
the defendant's articulation of at least one legitimate non-discriminatory reason
( LNR) for the job action, and 3) the pretext stage. 1 67 In St. Mary 's Honor Center
1 68
v. Hicks,
the Court held that the McDonnell Douglass test was purely
procedural. 1 69 In the aftermath of Hicks, the McDonnell Douglass test merely
forces the employer to respond to the plaintiff's prima facie case by presenting
evidence from which the fact finder can reach her own conclusion. 170 The
McDonnell Douglass test therefore serves as a tool to trigger the presumption of
discrim ination after the presentation of the prima facie case and also provides a
structure for the defendant's response in rebutting that presumption.
In mi xed motive cases, both legitimate and illegitimate factors prompt an
employment decision.171 To address this c omplexity, the Court added additional
specificity to disparate treatment jurisprudence with the addition of the motivat
i n g factor test. 1 72 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 1 73 the Court employed a
motivating factor test to be used when legitimate and illegitimate factors combine
to bring about a job action. 174 Title VII was amended in 1991 to require that any

See Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1 1 72, 1 1 82 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2001).
See Cooper, 390 F.3d at 724 n . 1 5 .
1 65 . 4 1 1 U.S. 792 ( 1 973); see also Cooper, 390 F.3 d at 723-24.
1 66 . McDonne ll Douglass Corp. v. Green, 4 1 1 U.S. 792, 802 ( 1 973).
1 67 . Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title
7i"m1111e11t Cases, 57 SMU L. REv. 83, 85 (2004).
1 68. 509 U.S. 502 ( 1 993 ).
1 63 .

1 64.

1 69. Id.
1 70.
171.
1 72 .
1 73 .
1 74.

Vll Dispara/e

at 52 1 .

See Chambers, supra note 1 67, at 88.
See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93 (2003).
Chambers, supra note 1 67, at 84.
490 U.S. 228 ( 1 989).
See id. at 249-250 (The Court stated:

In I mixed motive cases], we emphasized [that] the employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of
rnoti ve that is declared illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the

a
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illegitimate consideration of a protected trait in an employment decision
constitutes a per se violation of Title VII, regardless of its proportional influence
in the final decision. 1 75 The Court has maintained that the standard of proof for a
prima facie case of disparate treatment is a preponderance of the evidence,
meaning that the weight of the evidence points to an illegitimate discriminatory
motive. 176 Once it is shown that the an employer's employment practice was, by
a preponderance of the evidence, discriminatory, the burden shifts to the
employer to rebut the presumption and show a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the employment decision.
Since McDonnell Douglass and Price Waterhouse, disparate treatment cases
have been grouped into three categories: standard, McDonnell Douglass pretext,
and Price Waterhouse mixed motives. In the years since Price Waterhouse, the
weight of these distinctions has been lessened and disparate treatment cases are
generally treated the same. 177
1.

Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case

a. Individual Disparate Treatment.
Individual disparate treatment occurs when
an employee alleges her employer discriminated against her because she is a part

influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the
risk and because the risk was created not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing . . .
we have concluded that the plaintiff who shows that an impermissible motive played a
motivating part in an adverse employment decision has thereby placed upon the defendant the
burden to show that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the unlawful
motive).
175. See Pub. L. No. 102- 1 66, 1 05 Stat. 1 07 1 (199 1 ) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)) (West,

WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2) ("Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful

employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice."). But see Carey v. Mt. Desert Island Hosp., 1 56 F.3d 3 1 , 38-40 ( 1 st Cir.
1998) (no error found when jury inquiry regarding meaning of term "motivating factor," specifically
asking "how much weight is to be rendered to make decision," received instruction that plaintiff had
burden to show "it is more likely than not that gender was a motivating or determining factor in the firing
of the plaintiff by the defendant. . . . If you find that the plaintiff was discharged for reasons other than his
gender you must find for the defendant," because reversal would "impose an unrealistic burden of
perfection on a court facing the constant pressures of trial.").
176. See Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 ( 1 982) (The Court stated:
The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous. The
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available
position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to
an inference of unlawful discrimination.).
177. See generally Chambers, supra note 1 67, at 84. Chambers suggests that since in St. Mary s Honor
Center v. Hicks and Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Court eliminated the effect of the pretext test and the

distinction between standard and pretext cases, they have interpreted the motivating factor test in a
manner that eliminates the distinction between mixed motives and non mixed motives cases. Chambers
explores whether this collapse in Title VII distinctions will result in shifting more discretion to trial
judges. Id.
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1
of a protected group based on race, sex, national origin, or religion. 78 At all times
the plaintiff carries the ultimate burden of proving to the fact finder that an
1
employer intentionally discriminated against her. 79 The following categories
outline several ways in which a plaintiff claims intentional discrimination on the
hasis of sex: (i) failure to hire or promote, (ii) discharge, (iii) disciplinary action,
( i v) constructive discharge, (v) compensation, and (vi) employer retaliation
against an employee for filing a Title VII claim.
i . Hiring and Promotion. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in
hiring or promotion, an unsuccessful applicant or employee charging an
employer with sex discrimination must prove that: 1 ) she is a member of a
protected class, 2) she applied for and was qualified for a job or promotion for
which the employer was seeking applicants, 3) despite the applicant's qualifica
tions. she was rejected for the position, and 4) after the plaintiff's rejection the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from
indi viduals with similar qualifications. 1 80
Courts distinguish under what conditions an employee can bring a claim of
fai lure to promote. An employee cannot sustain a claim of discrimination in
promotion if an employer monitors a formal system for hiring and promotion and
the empl oyee fails to express a desire to be promoted or expresses a desire to be
promoted but does not follow the formal procedures. 1 8 1

1 78. See Renerally Burlington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 1 86 F.3d 1301, 1 3 1 9 ( 1 0th Cir. 1 999)

(d i sparate treatment analysis focuses on the treatment of individual employees and not on general action
towards a group.)
1 79. See

id. at

1 3 1 5 ("Because disparate treatment is a form of intentional discrimination, the plaintiff

must pro ve that his employer acted with a discriminatory intent or motive.").

180. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 4 1 1 U.S. 792, 802 ( 1 973) (an employee claiming race
discrimination must prove:
( i ) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which
the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(i v) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.) ;

.iee also Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v . Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.6 ( 1 981 ) (prima facie elements as
articulated in

McDonnell Douglass applied in sex discrimination case.);

Gu v. Boston Police Dep't, 3 1 2

F.>d 6 . 1 0 ( 1 st Cir. 2002) (female applicants made a prima facie case o f discrimination, demonstrating
that: ( I ) they are women ; (2) they applied for or expressed interest in the positions; and (3) they did nut
receive either job.).

1 8 1 . See Williams v. Giant Food, Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 2004) (The court stated:

If an

em ployer has a formal system of posting vacancies and allowing employees to apply for

such vacancies, a n employee who fails to apply for a particular position cannot establish a
prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote. In such a circumstance, the employee's
general requests for advancement are insufficient to support a claim for failure to promote. On
the other hand, if the employer fails to make its e mployees aware of vacancies, the application

requirement may be relaxed and the employee treated as if she had actually applied for a
specific position.);
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A claimant who files a complaint against her employer for
discrimination based on sex after being discharged must prove: I ) that she is a
member of a protected class, 2) that her performance adequately met her
employer's expectations, 3) that despite her performance, she was discharged or
demoted, and 4) that after her termination or demotion, the employer either
ii. Discharge.

sought a replacement candidate with similar qualifications or replaced the
claimant with an employee who was not a member of the claimant's protected
1
class, or both. 8 2 A split among the courts as to the fourth prong of the discharge

test can be traced to the Supreme Court's failure to clearly articulate a position
1
regarding that prong. 83 The majority of the circuit courts do not require that the
1
claimant show that her successor was not a member of her protected class. 84
Some courts deem the replacement's characteristics to be important to, but not

determinative of, their decision. 1 8 5 Certain circuits mandate the employer replace

see also Smith v. J. Smith Lanier & Co., 352 F.3d 1 342, 1 345 (I I th Cir. 2003) (general interest in being
rehired without submitting an application is not enough to establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination when a defendant-employer has publicized an open position).
182. See Walker v. MCI Telecom Corp., 1 999 WL 503534, at *4 (4th Cir. 1 999) (unpublished table
decision) (per curiam) (prim a facie elements of Title VII discriminatory charge claim outlined); see also
Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1 5 1 2 (D.C. Cir. 1 995); Cumpiano v. Banco
Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 1 53 ( l st Cir. 1990).
183. See St. Mary 's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 528 n. I ( 1 993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (The
Court stated:
The majority, following the courts below, mentions that Hicks' position was filled by a white
male . . . . This Cowt has not direcciy addressed the question whether the personal
characteristics of someone chosen to replace a Title VII plaintiff are material, and that issue is
not before us today.).

But cf O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 5 1 7 U . S . 308, 3 1 2 ( 1 996) (Age Discrimination in
Employment Act violation found applying McDonnell Douglas test: "the fact that one person in the
protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost
out because of his [status as a member of a protected class]'').
1 84. Toth v. Gates Rubber Co., 2000 WL 796068 ( 1 0th Cir. 2000) (unpublished disposition) (plaintiff
may also be able to satisfy her prima facie burden simply by introducing evidence that the position was
not eliminated without also demonstrating that she was replaced by someone outside her protected class)
(quoting Perry v. Woodward, 1 99 F.3d 1 1 26, 1 1 40 ( 1 0th Cir. 1 999), cert. denied, 529 U . S . 1 1 10 (2000)
(Hispanic plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge on the basis of race had satisfied the fourth element
of the prima facie test without showing that her replacement was outside her protected class)).
1 85. See, e.g., Nieto v. L & H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 62 1 , 624 (5th Cir. 1 997) (evidence that
replacement was within plai ntiff's protected class is "not outcome determinative," but is "certainly
material to the question of discriminatory intent"); Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 1 5�, 1 5 9
(7th Cir. 1996) (evidence that replacement was not protected class member, while i t "may h e l p t o raise an
inference of discrimination . . . it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition"); Cumpiano v. Banco
Santander P.R. , 902 F.2d 1 48, 1 54- 1 55 ( 1 st Cir. 1 990) (replacement employee's characteristics "m�y have
evidentiary force in a particular case," however, fourth prong may be satisfied "simply by showing that
. the employer had a continued need for someone to perform the same work after [the compl �man�]
left") ; Walker v. St. Anthony's Med. Ctr., 1 88 F.2d 554, 558 (8th Cir. 1 989) (the sex of the plaintiff s
.
replacement is a relevant consideration but not necessaril y a determina tive factor m whether she
established a prima facie case of discri�ination); Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 (�d Cir. I 985)
(evidence that replacement was within plaintiff' s protected class "may weaken, but certainly does not
eliminate, the inference of discrimination"); Schwartz v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 930 F. Supp. 3, 8
·

.
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the employee with someone who was not a member of the employee's protected
group. 1 86
S i milar prima facie case requirements exist when the complainant claims she
was discriminated against during a reduction-in-force (RIF) layoff. In these cases
the claimant must demonstrate that: 1 ) she is a member of a protected class; 2)
she was selected for discharge from a larger group of employees; 3) she was
performing at a level largely equivalent to the lowest category of the group
maintained; and 4) the selection process for discharge resulted in more favored
treatment for similarly situated employees who were not members of the
7
claimant's protected class. 1 8
iii. Disciplinary Action. In a claim of disparate treatment on the basis of sex
in the manner in which an employee is disciplined, the plaintiff must show that:
I ) she belongs to a protected class as specified i n Title VII; 2) that she was
qualified for the job that she holds or held; and 3) that a similarly situated
employee engaged i n identical or similar misconduct but received lesser or no
discipl ine. 1 88
iv. Constructive Discharge. Courts may recognize situations where the work
conditions are so unreasonably intolerable that a responsible employee would
feel forced to resign. In order to demonstrate that a company's actions amounted
to a constructive discharge the plaintiff most show: 1 ) the deliberateness of the
company's actions, and 2 ) that a reasonable employee encountering such
situation would leave her position. 1 89 A constructive discharge claim involves the

< D.D.C. 1 996) (evidence that replacement was within plaintiff's protected class is relevant but not
tlispositive to fourth prong).
1 86. See Bradshaw v. Pac. Bell, 72 Fed. Appx. 532 (9th Cir. 2003) (African-American employee failed
to establish prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII arising from his tennination of
employment, given lack of evidence that employee was replaced by someone outside of his protected
class . ) : Lovas v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 215 F.3d 1 3 26 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision),
available at 2000 WL 7 1 2355, at *5 ("A prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII requires a
plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . she was replaced by a person outside
of the protected class.").
1 87. See Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F. 3d 485, 494 (7th Cir. 2000) ; see also Verwey v. IU. Coll. of
Optometry, 43 Fed. Appx. 996, 999 (7th Cir. 2002) (When the discharged employee's duties are absorbed
by other employees, the "similarly situated" prong is inappropriate. This is situation is called a
"mini-RlF." even in cases where more than one employee has been terminated. A "mini-RIF'' requires a
plaintiff to establish that her duties were absorbed by employees who were not members of the protected
class.).
1 88 . See Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1 303, 1 336 ( 1 1th Cir. 2000).
1 89. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 1 24 S. Ct. 2342, 2347 (2004) (The Court stated:
For an atmosphere of sexual harassment or hostility to be actionable, the offending behavior
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and
create an abusive working environment. A hostile-environment constructive discharge claim
entails something more: a plaintiff who advances such a compound claim must show working
conditions so intolerable that a reasonable perso n would have felt compelled to resign.)
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employee's decision to leave and the precipitating conduct. '90 To prevail on a
disparate treatment claim asserting a constructive discharge, the employee must
give her employer a reasonable amount of time to correct the unlawful
discriminatory practice prior to her resignation. 1 9 1 In most constructive discharge
claims, the court examines whether the employer had notice of the harassing
working conditions and whether the employee took advantage of the established
avenues of redress or just unreasonably resigned. 192
v. Compensation. In order to establish a prima facie case of sex-based wage
or salary discrimination, a plaintiff must show that she is intentionally paid less
for performing substantially comparable work to the work performed by one or
more members of the opposite sex. 1 93 With the exception of the requirements for
claims of "comparable worth," the Title VII prima facie case of compensation
discrimination based on sex is similar to the prima facie requirements under the
Equal Pay Act. 194 A key difference, however, is that per the McDonnell Douglass
standard the claimant must offer at least inferential evidence that the salary
disparity i s a product of the employer's intentional discrimination against her on
account of her gender. 19 5
vi. Retaliation. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against
any employees or applicants for employment because they have opposed
unlawful practices or made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.196 In order to prevail on a
retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove that: 1 ) she engaged in

190. See id. at 2355.
1 9 1 . See id. at 2347.
192. See generally Shari M. Goldsmith, Casenote, The Supreme Court's Sunders Problem: Wrong
Question, Wrong Facts Detennining Whether Constructive Discharge ls a Tangible Employment A ction,

6 U. PA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 8 1 7 (2004).
193. See Belfi v. Prendergast, 1 9 1 F.3d 1 29, 140 (2d Cir. 1999) ("In order to make out a prima facie
case of unequal pay for equal work under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that ( l ) she is a member of a
protected class; and (2) she was paid less than non-members of her class for work requiring substantially
the same responsibility."); see also Lawrence v. CNF Transp. , Inc., 340 F.3d 486, 493-94 (8th Cir. 2003)
(employee prevailed on gender discrimination claim under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII because she
was paid less than her successor and was denied a benefit given to him); Sprague v. Thom Ams., l 29 F.3d
1355, 1 363 ( 1 0th Cir. 2003) ("A female Title VII plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of sex
discrimination by showing that she occupies a job similar to that of higher paid males." (quoting Meeks v.
Computer Assocs. Int'!, 15 F.3d ! 0 1 3 at 1 0 1 9 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 994)). But see Adams v. CBS Broad., Inc., 6 1
Fed. Appx. 285, 288 (7th Cir. 2003) (Supreme Court has not articulated how the standard four-part
McDonnell-Douglas analysis should be tailored to wage discrimination claims); Ghosh v. Ind. Dep't of
Envtl. Mgmt., 1 92 F.3d 1 087, 1 094 (7th Cir. 1 999) (Title VII has no definitive standard for establishing
prima facie case of compensation discrimination).
194. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2).
195. McDonnell Douglass v. Green, 4 1 1 U.S. 792, 802 ( 1 973). See Belfi v. Prendergast, 1 9 1 F.3d 1 29,
l 39 (2nd Cir. 1 999) (Title VII plaintiff must proffer evidence of "discriminatory animus" to establish a
prima facie case in addition to requirements under EPA).
1 96. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2).
.
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protected conduct under Title VII; 2) she suffered an adverse employment action;
a nd 3 ) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the

adverse employment action. 1 97 If, for instance, a wife and husband work at the
same company and the wife experiences retaliatory discrimination for the acts of
the husband, she may be able to bring a retaliation claim against her employer.
Courts are split on whether Title VII retaliation protection extends to third
•

parties.

1 98

In some circuits whether an employment action is "adverse" is considered on a
<.:asc-by-case basis. 1 99 Adverse acts carry "a significant risk of humiliation,

damage to reputation, and a concomitant harm to future employment pros-

1 1!7. Sec, <'.}:., Annett v. Univ. of Kan., 37 1 F.3d 1 23 3 , 1 237 ( 10th Cir. 2004); Erenberg v. Methodist

l lo sp. .157 E.\<l 787, 793 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Walcott v. City of Cleveland, 2005 WL 14982 (6th Cir.
,

:!IKl:'i I ( tmpuhlishe<l opinion) (The court stated:

To cstahlish a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment

action. a plaintiff must present evidence 'sufficient to raise the inference that her protected

activity was the likely reason for the adverse action.' Temporal proximity alone, without
additional evidence of a retaliatory animus, will not suffice to support a finding of a causal

connection. ) ;
I f i l l-Dyson v . City of Chicago, 2 8 2 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2002) (four requirements of modified

\kl>nnndl Douglass burden-shifting framework:
that t he plaintiff

I ) engaged in statutorily protected activity; 2) performed her job according to

her e m p loye r s legitimate expectations; 3) suffered a materially adverse employment action
'

despite meeting her employer's legitimate expectations; and 4) was treated less favorably than
similarly situated employees who did not engage in statutorily protected activity);

I >own s v. Postmaster General, 3 1 Fed. Appx. 848, 850 (6th Cir. 2002) (additional standard includes that
plaintiff must show that defendant was aware of the right to be protected against retaliation).
1 98. Compare EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 5 4 1 , 545-46 (6th Cir. 1993) (third party retaliation
t· laims comport with purpose of Title VII) with Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 1 5 1 F.3d 8 1 3, 819 (8th Cir.
l 998 ) ( textual interpretation of Title VII prohibits third party claims). See generally Anita G. Schausten,

( ·ornment. Retaliation Against Third Parties: A Potential Loophole in Title Vl/'s Discrimination

l'mrerrio11. 37 J . MARSHALL L. REv. 1 3 1 3 (2004) (discussing permissibility of third party retaliation

c l a im s ) .

1 99. See Hockman v. Westward Comms., LLC, 2004 WL 298035 1 (5th Cir. 2004) (in determining

whether a defendant's action constitutes an adverse employment action, courts are concerned solely with
ultimate empl oyment decisions; ultimate employment decisions include acts such as hiring, granting

leave. di scharging, promoting, and compensating.); see also Clayton v. Rumsfeld, 1 06 Fed. Appx. 268,
270 (5th Cir. 2004) (Interlocutory or intermediate decisions that can lead to an ultimate decision are
insufficient to support a prima facie case of retaliation. Consequently, the ultimate employment decision
doctrine requires that actionable adverse employment actions have more than a mere tangential effect on
a possible future ultimate employment decision.); White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry., 364 F.3d
789. 797-98 (6th Cir. 2004) (Reassignments without salary or work hour changes do not ordinarily
constitute adverse employment decisions in employment discrimination claims. A reassignment without

sal ary or work hour changes, however, may be an adverse employment action if it constitutes a demotion

evi denced by "a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material

responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation."). But see Smith v. City of

S a le m . .169 F.3d 9 1 2, 922 (6th Cir. 2004) (where fireman was suspended for twenty-four hours, the

�mployment action sufficiently satisfied the requirements of an adverse employment action. Since
h rcmen work in twenty-four hour shifts, the suspension amounted to the equivalent of a loss of pay for
60'k of the workweek.).
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pects."200 Courts usually find that an "adverse employment action" does not
encompass a mere inconvenience or a change in job responsibilities, but that the
action must be "materially adverse" to the employee's job status, such as a
change in salary, benefits, or responsibilities 20 1 The retaliation may also take
place after terminatio n of employment.202
Systemic disparate treatment is a recurring
practice, a consistent attitude, or prevalent attitudes and beliefs inculcated into
the work environment that prove intentional discrimination on account of
gender. 203 In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 204 the
defining case for systemic disparate treatment, the Court held that an employer
who does not habitually discriminate should, over time, develop w ithin its labor
force an incidence of protected group representation not considerably less than.
that group's representation in an available pool of qualified c andidates. 205
Systemic disparate treatment is demonstrated by a considerable labor force
under-representation of a protected group relative to the incidence one would
anticipate based on its members' interest, availability, and qualifications. 206 In
b.

Systemic Disparate Treatment.

200. See Annett v. Univ. of Kan., 3 7 1 F.3d 1 233, I 239 ( 1 0th Cir. 2004) (The court stated:
We liberally define the phrase adverse employment action and do not limit such actions to
monetary losses in the form of wages or benefits. In so defining the phrase, we c onsider acts

that carry a significant risk of humiliation, damage to reputation, and a concomitant harm to
future employment prospects. Therefore, an action that significantly harms a plaintiff's future
employment prospects may be considered an adverse action.).

201. See DiBrino v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 1 I 8 Fed. Appx. 533, 2004 WL 2861673 (2d Cir. 2004)

("An adverse action must be a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment. To

be materially adverse, a change in working conditions must be more disruptiv e than a mere

inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.").
202. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 5 1 9 U . S . 337, 346 ( 1 997) (former employees are included under
Title VII's protections); see also Fischer v. AT&T Corp., 1 998 WL 78996 (7th Cir. I998) ("Post

termination acts of retaliation that undermine a former employee's future employment prospects or
otherwise have a nexus to employment are actionable under Title VIL").

203 . See 1 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION COMPILATION MANUAL (BNA) 2:0005, cited in Jenson v. Eveleth
Taconite Co., 1 30 F.3d 1287, 1 30 1 (8th Cir. 1 997) (The court stated:
Employment policies or practices that serve to differentiate or to perpetuate a differentiation i n
terms or conditions o f employment o f applicants o r employees because of their status as
members of a particular group . . . . Systemic discrimination . . . concerns a recurring practice or
continuing policy rather than an isolated act of discrimination.).

204. 43 l U.S. 324 (1 977).
205. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 43 1 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 ( 1 977).
206. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 3 1 2 ( 1 977) (where special
quali fications are at issue, the relevant statistical pool must refer to the number of members of the plaintiff
class qualified for, interested in, and able to commute to the particular task); see also Alexander v. Fulton
County, 207 F.3d 1 303, 1 327-28 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2000) (laymen are not considerably qualified for the law
enforcement positions in question, and observing that evidence of a minority 's under representation in an
employer's workforce by reference to the general population can make one infer discrimination only m
the rare case "involving jobs with low skill levels where the applicant pool can be considered roughly
coextensive with the general population".).
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Haz.e/wood School District v. United States, 207 the Court held that Title VII
makes no explicit requirements that the workforce mirror the general population
2
in its racial, ethnic, religious, or gender make-up. 08
Employment procedures that result in unequal representation are not saved by
an employer's good intentions or absence of discriminatory intent. 209 Systemic
di sparate treatment can be proven from a facially discriminatory policy, from
.
. . on d'1sproport10na
'
te outcomes, 21 0 anecd ota1 ev1'dence,2 1 1 or a combmastat1st1cs
t ion of all of these factors. 212 In a systemic disparate treatment case seeking
dass-wide injunctive or declaratory relief, plaintiffs need not present evidence
that each person who seeks relief was a victim of the employer's discriminatory
policy to establish their prima facie case. 2 1 3 Rather, the burden is to prove only
that the di scrimination was the company's standard operating procedure. This
may be done through statistics alone.214
i. Formal Policies. Title VII prohibits formal employer policies which
establish distinctions that classify certain occupations as male or female

.:!07. 4�� U.S. 299 ( 1 977).

:!OX. S<•c• Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 ( 1 977) (The Court stated:

Ahsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will
in t irne result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of
the population in the community from which employees are hired. Evidence of long-lasting and
i:mss disparity between the composition of a work force and that of the general population thus
may he significant even though § 703 U) makes clear that Title VII imposes no requirement that
a work force mirror the general population.);
,,.,. al.w Van v. Plant & Field Serv. Corp., 672 F.Supp. 1 306, 1 3 1 2 (C.D. CA 1987), aff'd, Van v. Plant &
hel d Serv. Corp .. 872 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1 989) (The court stated:
Traditional proof of discrimination begins with the determination of a disparity between the
minority group's representation in a relevant population and that group's representation in the
particular position under scrutiny. The demonstration of a percentage difference between the
two is sufficient to constitute a violation of Title VII, even absent an explanation in terms of
di ffering job-related abilities. The law initially presumes that no such disparity exists.).
209. l111emational Brotherhood of Teamsters, 43 1 U.S. at 343 ("Affirmations of good faith in making

are insufficient to dispel a prima facie case of systematic exclusion." (citing
v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 ( 1 972))) .
.:! I 0. Id. at 339 ("Statistical analyses have served and will continue to serve an important role in cases
in which the existence of discrimination is a disputed issue." (citing Mayor of Philadelphia v. Education al
Equality League, 4 1 5 U . S . 605, 620 (1 974))) .
.:! 1 1 . Sl'(' Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1 325 (anecdotal evidence concerning discriminatory treatment of
�imilarly situated co-plaintiffs or nonparties who are members of a complainant's protected group
"undoubtedly are relevant to every other plaintiff's core allegation of systemic discrimination); see also
Da mo n v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 1 96 F.3d 1 354, 1 3 6 1 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1999) (anecdotal evidence
is s i g n i ficant in cases of individual plaintiffs alleging individual disparate treatment).
2 1 2 . See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 3.2 1 (200 1 ) .
.:! I J. Beck v. Boeing Co., 60 Fed. Appx. 38, 3-4 (9th Cir. 2003)
individual selections

A l exander

.

.:! 1 4. Id.
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positions,2 1 5 sex-specific employment guidelines without imposing comparable
requirements for employees of the opposite sex,2 1 6 and the disparate compensa
tion or provision of benefit plans which either provide benefits at different
rates 2 17 or require different contributions218 based on the employee's sex are
prohibited under Title VII. 2 19 If an employer's policy draws distinctions based on
a prohibited characteristic a group of complainants can establish a disparate
treatment claim based solely upon that policy. 220
A policy that facially discriminates between employees on account of their sex
is a per se violation of Title VII. The defendant may escape liability, however, by
asserting a bona fi de Occupational Qualification defense (BFOQ). 22 1 This
defense is not applicable in the context of race, and the defendant employer bears
2 1 5 . See, e.g., Long v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 8 8 2 F. Supp. 1553,
1559 (D. Md. 1 995) (Title VII violation found when employer refused to interview female candidate for
road controller position in Japan operations, despite her qualifications, based on preference for male
employee to occupy position because refusal constituted formal policy of discrimination).
2 16. See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1 028, 1029- 1030 (7th Cir. 1979)
(personal appearance regulations with differing requirements for women and men do not violate Title VII
as long as requirement is justified by some commonly accepted social norm and it is reasonably related to
employer's business needs; however, an employer who imposes separate dress requirements for women
and men performing same jobs will be in violation of Title VII when one sex can wear regular business
attire and other is forced to wear not just specified business attire, but a uniform); O'Donnell v.
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 266 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (employer contends
requirement that only women wear smocks is not a Title VII violation). But see Harper v. Blockbuster
Entm't Corp., 1 39 F.3d 1 385, 1 387 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1998) (no Title VII violation found when employer
enforced hair length policy for male, but not female employees because courts had rejected sex-specific
grooming policies as violative of Title VU's mandate of equal employment opportunities).
217. See, e.g., Ariz. Governing Comm. For Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. v. Norris, 463
U.S. 1073, 1 074 ( 1983) (Title VII violation found when companies selected to provide retirement
benefits for employees calculated monthly benefit payments on sex-based mortality tables resulting in
lower monthly benefits for females than similarly-situated males that contributed equal amounts during
tenure).
2 1 8 . See L.A. Dep' t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 7 1 2 ( 1 978) (Title VII violation found
when employer relied on actuarial tables based entirely on sex to require greater contributions from
female employees); see also Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans
v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1074 ( 1983) (Title VII prohibits an employer from offering its employees option
of receiving retirement benefits from one of several companies selected by employer, all of which pay a
woman lower monthly retirement benefits than a man who has made same contributions).
2 1 9 . 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2).
220. See, e.g., Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Compensation Plans, 463 U.S. at 1081 -82
( 1983); L.A. Dep't of Water & Power, 435 U.S. at 7 1 1 (policy required a greater contribution from female
than male employees for the same periodic pension benefits and provided women lesser periodic pension
benefits than men for equal amounts donated).
22 1 . 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2) (Stating:
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees,
for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, for a labor
organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or
for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling
apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in
any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise).
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the burden of persuasion. 222 The employer must demonstrate that its discrimina
tory practice relates to a characteristic that goes to the "essence" of the enterprise
and bears a high correlation to the plaintiff's capacity to perform her job. 223
ii. Pattern and Practice. In order to prove that an employer's pattern and
practice of hiring, promotion, or other personnel and employment related
activities constituted systemic disparate treatment against a protected group, a
plai n t i ff must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that sex
di scri m i nation was the organization's standard operating procedure. 224 "Sporadic
d i scri m i natory acts" are insufficient to state a Title VII claim. 225
Plaintiffs will often use statistical evidence to demonstrate that the discrimina
tory action is the employer's standard operating procedure. 226 Statistical
ev idence allows the court to draw an inference that the pattern of adverse actions
agai nst employees of one sex is the result of discriminatory treatment. If left
unrc hutted, this inference can carry the plaintiff's burden of persuasion. 227
Statistical evidence is useless, however, i f it lacks a basis for comparison to the

2 2 2 . St·e 29 U.S.C. � 623f (West, WESTLAW through PL. 109-2) (outlines areas where a bona fide
rn:cu pational qualification defense is available).
2 2 3 . W. Air. Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 4 1 6- 1 7 ( 1 985). For more on the BFOQ defense, see
discussion i1!fi·a 11.A.2.
2 2 4 . Set• International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 43 1 U.S. 327, 336-37 (1977)
f patlcrn an<l practice of discrimination found when African Americans and persons with Spanish
surnames were rejected from employment or granted less desirable jobs with limited pay and limited
power to hargain because employer 's reliance on seniority system perpetuated past discrimination); see
also EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1 286 (1 lth Cir. 2000) (The court stated:

A pallcrn and practice claim either may be brought by the EEOC if there is reasonable cause to
hclicvc that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination
or by a class of private plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. In such suits, the plaintiffs must

establish that sex discrimination was the company's standard operating procedure. To meet this
hurden of proof, a plaintiff must prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or accidental
or sporadic discriminatory acts. It has to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
discrimination is the company's standard operating procedure - the regular rather than unusual
practice.).

EEOC v. High Top Coal Co., 677 F.2d 1 1 36, 1 1 37 (6th Cir. 1 987) (district court rejection of
pattern and practice discrimination claim not clearly erroneous even though only one of 276 miners was
female ) .

Hur see

225. See lmernational Brotherhood of Teamsters, 43 1 U.S. at 336.
226. See id. at 339 ("Our cases make it unmistakably clear that statistical analyses have served and
will co ntinue to serve an important role in cases in which the existence of discrimination is a disputed
issue." ).

227. Id. at 340 n.20 (statistical evidence of "longstanding and gross disparity" may suffice to make out

a pri ma facie case of pattern and practice discrimination under Title VII because "absent explanation, it is
ordinari ly to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more
or less representative of the racial and ethic composition of the population in the community from which
cmployees are hired"); see, e.g., EEOC v. Olson's Diary Queens, Inc., 989 F.2d 165, 169 (5th Cir. 1993)

f pattern and practice of discrimination claim stated when both statistical and anecdotal evidence poin ted
to racial discrimination in hiring; lower court erred by failing to "fully" consider statistical "applicant
now" analys is provided by EEOC expert witness).
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qualified labor pool .228 Therefore plaintiffs must provide an appropriate bench
mark against which the court may evaluate a statistical disparity.229 While
anecdotal evidence may strengthen a case evidence of disparate treatment, some
courts have held that, where the disparities are gross, statistical disparities alone
may not prove intentional discrimination.23 0 Plaintiffs do not have to prove
discrimination with scientific certainty,23 1 however, statistical evidence display
ing gross disparities in the representation of groups, coupled with anecdotal or
circumstantial evidence, may establish a discriminatory pattern or practice.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the EEOC allow pattern and practice
claims to be brought by means of a private class action suit.232 Certification of
class action status is dependent upon the court's determination that the class
action is "manageable. "233 Prior to filing a class action suit, however, at least one

228. See, e.g., Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc., 1 3 1 F.3d 957, 963 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1997) (no pattern and
practice of discrimination found when assistant plant manager alleging racial discrimination in being
passed over for manager position only demonstrated statistical evidence of disproportionately low
number of African-American supervisory employees without proffering statistical evidence of African
American applicants for those positions because "statistics without an analytic foundation are 'virtually
meaningless'").
229. See Forehand v. Fla. State Hosp., 89 F.3d 1562, 1 574 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1996) ("Courts should adopt the
benchmark which most accurately reflects the pool of workers from which promotions are granted unless
that pool has been skewed by other discriminatory hiring practices."); Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701 , 709
(D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Where liability depends on a challenge to systemic employment practices-courts have
required finely tuned statistical evidence, normally demanding a comparison of the employer's relevant
workforce with the qualified populations in the relevant labor market.").
230. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States., 433 U.S. 299, 307 ( 1 977) ("Where gross statistical
disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or
practice of discrimination." (citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 43 1 U.S.
324, 340 n.20 ( 1 977))); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 43 1 U.S. at 340 n.20 ("Evidence of
long-lasting and gross disparity between the composition of a work force and that of the general
population thus may be significant even though . . . Title VII imposes no requirement that a work force
mirror the general population."). "We caution only that statistics are not irrefutable; they come in infinite
variety and, like any other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their usefulness depends on
all of the surrounding facts and circumstances." International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 4 3 1 U.S. at 340.
23 1 . See Bazemore v. United States, 478 U.S. 385, 400 ( 1 986) ("A plaintiff in a Title VII suit need not
prove discrimination with scientific certainty; rather, his or her burden is to prove discrimination by a
preponderance of the evidence.").
232. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 3 1 8, 320 ( 1 980) (EEOC's pattern and practice claim not
subject to requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23); see, e.g., EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg.
of Am., Inc., 102 F.3d 869, 870 (7th Cir. 1 996) (EEOC intervened in private class action suit brought by
female employees for hostile environment sexual harassment claim).
233. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (class action may be maintained when, in addition to fulfillment of Rule
23(a) requirements, ( I ) proceeding individually would risk inconsistent rulings or earlier rulings would
preclude later claims; (2) defendant's actions were such that class-wide relief is appropriate, or (3)
common questions of law predominate); Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1 482 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 987) (The
court stated:
As with any private class action, the legitimacy of a private Title VII suit brought o n behalf of a
class depends upon the satisfaction of two distinct prerequisites. First, there must be an
individual plaintiff with a cognizable claim, that is, an individual who has constitutional
standing to raise the claim (or claims) and who has satisfied the procedural requirements of
Title VII. Second, the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be
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the class representatives must exhaust all administrative remedies under Title

VIl .214
2.

Elements of a Prima Facie Federal Sexual Harassment Case

A plaintiff bringing a sexual harassment suit must first
that the alleged conduct was unwelcome and unsolicited.235 A plaintiff
must also show that she perceived the conduct as offensive.236 The defendant
may introduce evidence of the plaintiff's sexual conduct towards the accused
harasser to demonstrate that the plaintiff welcomed the defendant's behavior if
1hc evidence is not prej udicial.237 The trier of fact determines unwelcomeness by
asking whether the plaintiff's conduct indicated that she did not welcome the
al leged sexual advances, not whether her actual participation in sexual inter
course was voluntary.238
a.

Unwelcomeness.

prove

of . . . Sex Rationale. Title VII requires that sexual harassment
a result of the victim's sex. The determination is based on whether an
i n d i v idual is treated differently in the workplace because of his or her status as a
man or a woman. 239 The critical issue in the "because of sex" inquiry is whether
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed. 240 Courts often
anal yze this element by asking if the harassment would have occurred "but for"
or be c a use of' the victim's sex. This standard has been applied i n cases of same
sex sexual harassment,24 1 and the court has explicitly held that "nothing in Title
V I I necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of . . . sex' merely
h. Because

occur as

"

fulfi l l ed; in other words, the individual plaintiff must be qualified to represent the members of

the class in accordance with the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a), and the action must be one of

the three types Rule 23(b) identifies.);

also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 1 56, 1 64 ( 1 974) ("Commonly referred to as
m an age ability [Rule 23(b)] consideration encompasses the whole range of practical problems that may
render the class action format inappropriate for a particular suit." Manageability i s a factor in Rule
Dlh)( 3 ) classes, but is not explicitly supposed to be a factor in Rule 23(b)(l) or Rule 23(b)(2) classes).
234. See Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1 968), cited in Calloway v.
Partners Nat'! Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 450 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 993).
235. See Meritor Savings Banlc, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 ( 1 986) ("The gravamen of any sexual
harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome.").

st'('

,·

·

236.

237

·

I 1 990 );

See id.
See EEOC, Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, EEOC Notice No. 915-050
.\'N' also Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 73; FEo R. EVID. 4 1 2(b)(2) ("[E]vidence offered to

prove the sexual behavior or sexual predisposition of an alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise
admissihle under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any
'ictim and of unfair prejudice to any party.").
238. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 68.
239. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 5 1 0 U.S. 17, 25 ( 1 993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
_240. Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., 335 F.3d 325, 3 3 1 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., 523 U . S . 75, 80 ( 1 998)).
24 1 . See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, 82 ( 1 998).
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because the plaintiff and the defendant are of the same sex."242
In Ocheltree v. Scollan Productions, Inc., 243 the defendant employer argued
that the harassing conduct was not directed towards the plaintiff because of her
sex, because it was heard by everyone in the shop and equally offensive to some
of the male employees. 244 The court found that while the harassment was out in
the open, it was directed at plaintiff employee specifically because she was the
only woman in the shop.245 Specifically, the court cited that there was no
evidence that the conduct in question was aimed at embarrassing any of the men
or that it was calculated to generate laughter at the expense of any man. 246
3 . Types of Sexual Harassment

The terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment" first appeared in
academic literature and do not actually appear in the statutory text of Title VII. 247
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,248 the Court first distinguished between
quid pro quo and hostile environment claims, holding that both were cognizable
under Title VIL 249
a.

Quid Pro Quo.
Employees claiming quid pro quo harassment must demonstrate both that their
employer took a tangible employment-related action against them250 and that
they refused their unwelcome sexual advances. 2 5 t To establish a prima facie case
of quid pro quo sexual harassment, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
"explicitly or implicitly conditioned a job, a j ob benefit, or the absence of a job
detriment, upon her acceptance of sexual conduct."2 5 2 The court has held that the
supervisor does not need to be empowered to make the final determination on
employment decisions for his or her behavior to constitute a quid pro quo action,

242.

Id.

at 79.

243. 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003 ).
244.
245.
246.
247.

Ocheltree, 335 F.3d at 332.
Id.
Id.
See generally, c. MACKINNON,

SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN ( 1 979); Meritor

Savings Banlc, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 ( 1 986); E. Scalia,

Harassment,

2 1 HARV.

The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual

J. L. & PUB. POLICY 307 ( 1 9 89).

248. 477 U.S. 57 ( 1 986).
249.

Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 65; see also Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-54

( 1 998) (discussing history of the development of quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual
harassment).
250.

See, e.g., Burlington Indus.,

524 U.S. at 761 -62 (hiring, firing, failing to promote, and other

significant changes in the employee's status constitute tangible employment action).
25 1 .

See, e.g.,

Frederick v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1 305, 1 3 1 2 ( 1 1 th Cir. 200 1 ) (denied

summary judgment for plaintiff who failed to demonstrate connection between alleged refusal of sexual
advances and denial of promotion).
252. Porter v. Cal. Dep't. of Coffections, 383 F.3d 1 0 1 8 , 1 025 (9th Cir. 2004),
Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1 995).

quoting

Heyne v.

650

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF GENDER AND THE LAW

[Vol. VI:6 15

rather the power to make an effective recommendation is enough.253
Hostile Environment.
A hostile work environment claim consists of five elements: 1 ) the plaintiff
belongs to a protected group; 2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual
harassment; 3) the harassment complained of was based on sex; 4) the
harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment; and 5) her
employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take
prompt remedial action. 254 The Supreme Court first recognized the hostile work
e n v ironment claim in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson. 255 In determining
whether a hostile work environment exists, courts have taken a "totality of the
<.:i n.:umstances" approach 256 While no single factor is required, courts look to 1)
.
the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; 2) its severity; 3 ) whether it is
phys ically threatening or humiliating as opposed to a mere offensive utterance; 4)
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance; and 5)
whether the complained-of conduct undermines the plaintiff's workplace compe
tence. 2 � 7
A hostile work environment claim comprises a series of separate acts that
collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice. 258 To estab lish a
hos ti le work environment claim, the plaintiff must show that the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and
create a hostile working environment and that the harassing conduct occurred
hccause of her sex. 2 59 In order for the harassment to be actionable, the harassing
conduct must have been "so severely permeated with discriminatory intimida
ti on, ridicule, and insult that the terms and conditions of her employment were
thereby altered."260 The Court has specifically held that:
h.

Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reason
able person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's
purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subj ectively perceive the
environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the

253. See Holly

D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1 15 8, 1 1 69 n. 1 4 (9th Cir. 2003) .
Hockman v. Westward Communs., 2004 WL 298035 1 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Amtrak v.
Morgan. 536 U.S. I O I , 1 1 6 (2002).
255. 477 U.S. 57 ( l 986).
256. Hockman, 2004 WL 298035 1 .
257. Id. , 2004 WL 298035 1 , at *6.
258. Lyo n v. Jones, 260 F.Supp. 2d 507, 5 1 1 (6th Cir. 2004); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)( l) (West,
WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2).
259. Lyon, 260 F. S upp. 2d at 5 1 2 (citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, 5 10 U.S. 1 7, 2 1 ( 1 993); Alfano v.
Costell o, 294 F.3d 365,37 4 (2d Cir. 2002)) .
260. Lyon, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 5 1 2 (citing A lfan o v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373 (2d Cir. 2002)) .
254.
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conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII
violation. 261
A single instance of sexual harassment can suffice to prove the existence of a
hostile work environrnent.262 But as a general rule, incidents must be more than
episodic; they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted to be deemed
pervasive.263 To determine whether events constitute "one unlawful employment
practice," courts consider whether they were sufficiently severe or pervasive and
whether the earlier and later events amounted to the same type of employment
actions, occurred relatively frequently, or were perpetrated by the same
managers.264
4.

Employer Defenses

Section 703(e)( l ) of Title VII allows an employer a defense to policies that
expressly or facially discriminate on the basis of religion, national origin, or
gender.265 Additionally, the courts have recognized several defenses for Title VII
defendants who exercise disparate treatment of employees, including reductions
in workforce,266 narrowly-tailored affirmative action programs,267 bona fide

261 . Lyon, 260 F.Supp. 2d at 5 1 2 (citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, 5 1 0 U.S. 17, 2 1 -22 ( 1 993)).
262. See Ferris v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 1 28, 1 36 (2d Cir. 2001 ) ; see also Brooks v. City of San
Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 925-27 (9th Cir. 2000).
263. See Lyon, 260 F.Supp. 2d at 5 12; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788
(1998) (Title VII does not prohibit "genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women
routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex." Simple teasing, offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in
the "terms and conditions of employment." These standards for judging hostility are sufficiently
demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a "general civility code." Properly applied, they will
filter out complaints attacking "the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of
abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.").
264. Porter v. Cal. Dep't. of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1 0 1 8 , 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2004).
265. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)( l ) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2) (this provision forbids "an
employer- '( l ) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's . . . sex.'").
266. See, e.g., Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 1 6 1 F.3d 1 3 18, 1 3 3 1 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 998) (no Title VII
violation found when employee failed to meet burden of persuasion because failed to show that RIF
termination was pretextual), reh'g and reh 'g en bane denied, 187 F.3d 1 287 (1 lth Cir. 1999); Ailor v.
First State Bank, 940 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1 99 1 ) (unpublished table decision) (no Title V I I violation found
when, following net loss of $ 58,000, bank terminated male employee based on seniority and female
employee to cut costs because economic necessity was acceptable justification for RIF termination),
available at 1 99 1 WL 150790, at *4.
267. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 6 1 6, 626 ( 1987) (no Title VII violation found
when employer considered candidates' sex and promoted female candidate over male plaintiff because
preferential treatment was pursuant to legitimate affirmative action plan). The plaintiff bears the burden
of showing that the affirmative action plan is invalid. See id. at 627. A plan is valid when it is
implemented to correct a manifest imbalance in the workplace and is narrowly tailored in duration and
scope so as not to unnecessarily infringe upon the rights of non-minorities. See United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 ( 1 979) (no Title VII violation found when preferential treatment was based on
acceptable affirmative action program adopted as temporary measure to eliminate manifest imbalance in
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seniority systems, 2 6 selections based o n particular nondiscriminatory qualifica
tions, 269 and other legitimate business reasons. 270 Employers are not al lowed,
however, to discriminate in post-hire terms and conditions of employment
(compensation, promotion, discipline, harassment, or discharge), or practice any
discrim ination on the basis of race.27 1
An employer can escape liability for disparate treatment on the basis of sex by
either showing that she would have reached the same conclusion without
con sidering sex, 272 or that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ),
which is reasonably necessary for the normal operation of business.273 The
former instance limits an employer's liability to injunctive relief and attorneys'
fees. 274 The latter is limited to situations where the employee's sex interferes with
her abil ity to perform the j ob.275 An employer must show, however, that its
di scrimi natory practice relates to the "essence" of the business and bears a high
correlation to the plaintiff's capacity to do her job.276 While this defense was

workfon:e ) ; .l'l'l' also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 ( 1 989) (Title VII violation
found when affirmative action program failed to limit scope of injury to non-minorities or duration of
prowam hccause not sufficiently tailored to remedy past discrimination).
268. S<'t', e.g

.•

Dodd v. Runyon, 1 78 F.3d 1 024, 1 028 (8th Cir. 1 999) (no Title

VII violation found

when fai l ure to promote female employee was based on seniority system that precluded clerks from
advarKing IO position of carrier).
269. Sel', <'.g Arway v. Norwalk Dep't of Police Serv., 1 25 F.3d 843 (2d Cir. 1 997) (unpublished table
.•

lkrision ) ( no Title VII violation found when male employee was promoted to Chief of Police over female
l'andidate because she was less qualified), available at 1997 WL 5 89909, at * l ; Smallwood v. Jefferson
( 'ounty. 95 F.3d 1 1 5 3 (6th Cir. 1 996) (unpublished table decision) ("desire to hire a more qualified
appl i1:m11 may constitute a legitimate business reason for a pay differential"),

available at 1996 WL

.t<J0.1 53. at *4.
270. In a pattern and practice case, the defendant must show that each employment decision was
n:a1:hcd. not as a result of a discriminatory policy, but rather for legitimate business reasons subject to
plaintiff's demonstration that the proffered reasons were pretextual. See International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 43 1 U.S. 324, 362 n.50 ( 1 977) (defendant's justifications were subject to
further evidence by government that purported reason for applicant's rejection was pretext for unlawful

di scrimination).

See EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 7 8 1 F.2d 1 362, 1 367 (9th Cir. 1986).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2) (sex is prohibited as
motivating factor in employment decisions); id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (prevailing plaintiff limited to
27 1 .
272.

<lcdaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C.

§

2000e-2(m) when

employer shows it would have made the same decision absent consideration of protected characteristic).
273.

See,

e. g ., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 3 2 1 , 335-37 ( 1 977) (Sex-based BFOQ found when

pla1:ement of females in prison guard position "posed a substantial security problem, directly linked to the
sex of the prison guard").
274. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2) (sex is prohibited as
motivating factor in employment decisions); id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (prevailing plaintiff limited to
dedaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) when
employer shows it would have made the same decision absent consideration of protected characteristic).
275.

See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 1 87, 204 ( 1 99 1 ) (no sex-based BFOQ found when

di scrimination was based on desire to protect female employees' future children, not employees, because
"permissible distinctions based on sex must relate to ability to perform the duties of the job").
276.

See W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 4 1 7 n.24 ( 1 985) (The Court stated:

An employer asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of proving that ( 1 ) the age limit is

reasonably necessary to the essence of the business, and either (2) that all or substantially all
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thought at the time of its creation to be considerably broad, the Court's decision
in International Union, U.A. W v. Johnson Controls277 proves that the exception
is a narrow one. There the Court clarified that the trait the employer targets with
its discriminatory practice must be not only essential to the business as a whole,
but also be tied only to the particular job in question . 278 The Court did recognize,
however, that discrimination could be tolerated when the safety of third parties is
endangered because the employee's gender "actually interferes with the employ
ee's ability to perform the job."279
Some courts recognize a narrow BFOQ exception when the employer can
show that it had reason to believe that its gender-based hiring policy was
necessary to safeguard legitimate privacy interests o f third parties. 280 Some

individuals excluded from the job involved are in fact disqualified, or (3) that some of the
individuals so excluded possess a disqualifying trait that cannot be ascertained except by
reference to age. If the employer's objective in asserting a BFOQ is the goal of public safety,
the employer must prove that the challenged practice does indeed effectuate that goal and that
there is no acceptable alternative which would better advance it or equally advance it with less
discriminatory impact.
(citing 46 Fed. Reg. 47727 ( 198 1), C.F.R. § 1 625.6(b) ( 1 984))); see also Diaz v. Pan Am. World A irways,
Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1 97 1), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 ( 1 9 7 1) (the psychological
reassurance or sexual titillation presumably afforded airline passengers by a requirement that flight
attendants be female could not excuse discriminating against males once the court defined the essence of
the business as safe transportation rather than maximum profit); Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d
228, 234 (5th Cir. 1 969) (even if discriminating against a protected group is intended to improve the
operation of a function crucial to the enterprise, the employer's evidence must show that "all or
substantially all" members of the protected group lack the required characteristic and would thus be
unable to suffic iently perform that function).
277. 499 U.S. 1 87, 206 ( 1 991) (employer's rule barred all still-fertile women of any age, marital
status, or child-bearing inclination from holding a position in which they would be likely to be
susceptible to lead exposure that endangered the health of a fetus they might be carrying. The Court
rejected the defense because, according to the record, "Fertile women . . . participate in the manufacture
of batteries as effic iently as anyone else.").
278. See id. at 20 1 (the defense fails unless the defendant demonstrates objectively that the
discrimination is not only "reasonably necessary" to the "normal operation" of the "particular" business
but also relates to "job-related skills and aptitudes"). Some courts require the employer to show that there
were no available alternatives to the discrimination. See, e.g., Reed v. County of Casey, 1 84 F.3d 597, 600
(6th Cir. 1 999) (sex-based BFOQ found when state law required presence of female prison guard when
female prisoner was lodged in jail and transfer of female employee from first to third shift justified when
no effective alternative existed due to logistical complications and unpredictability of need); Chambers v.
Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 704-05 (8th Cir. 1987) (sex-based BFOQ found when employer
terminated unmarried, pregnant female employee because primary purpose of organization was to serve
as role model for teenage girls and employee's contact with girls was inevitable).
279. See International Union, U.A. W, 499 U.S. at 204. Compare Dothard v. R awlinson, 433 U.S. 3 2 1 ,
322 (1 997) (sex-based BFOQ found when position o f prison guard entailed significant contact with male
sex offenders in maximum security prison because placement of women in those jobs would "pose a
substantial security problem, directly linked to the sex of the prison guard"), with International Union,
U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 1 87, 204 ( 1 991) (no sex based B FOQ found when defendant
discriminated against fertile women from jobs involving actual or potential or actual lead exposure to
prevent birth defects because policy was not enacted to protect health of employees, but rather to protect
health of unborn children).
280. See Olsen v. Marriott lnt'l, Inc, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1069 (D. Ariz. 1 999) (privacy-based BFOQ
_
two-factor test required defendant to show that: ( 1) "legitimate privacy rights of patients, clients, or

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF GEN DER AND THE LAW

654

[Vol. VI:615

courts require that the defendant show that there were no available alternatives to
the discrimination.281
In the case of systemic disparate treatment, the employer 's defense must be
"designed to meet the prima facie case" established by plaintiff's statistical proof,
the focus of its rebuttal case likewise "will not be o n individual employment
dccisions. "282 Instead, to meet its rebuttal burden, the employer must demon
strate that the plaintiff's statistical evidence "is either inaccurate or insignifi
"210
cant.
Employers can implement affirmative action programs to counter past
discri m i nation and use those programs as a defense against discriminatory
pract i ces. The Court has held that an employer can lawfully take race into
account in preferring African-American employees as a group for admission to
an on-the-job training program.284 Likewise, employers may take gender into
account to address the problem of the u nder-representation of women in the
workforce. The employer must demonstrate that the affirmative action plan
re flects the imbalances caused by past discrimination i n the workplace, 285 and the
plai n t i ff bears the burden of proving that the affirmative action plan violates Title
VII.
I n Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 286 the Court rejected the view that
employers are always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their
s u pervi s o rs . 287 The Court realized, however, that the appellate courts struggled in
the wake of the Meritor decision to find manageable standards to govern

inm;ues would be violated by hiring members of one sex to fill the position at issue" ; and (2) "there are no

'reasonable alternatives to a sex-based policy" (quoting Hernandez v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 793 F. Supp.

2 1 4. 2 1 6 (D. Minn. 1 992))); Jennings v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp. 376, 380-81
( S.D.N. Y. 1992) (privacy-based BFOQ three-factor test required defendant to show that: ( l ) it had

"fac1ual basis for believing that it i s necessary" to employ person of particular sex in position to

"protected

the privacy interests" of third party; (2) third party's "privacy interest if entitled to protection
other than the gender

under the law"; and (3) "no reasonable alternatives exist to protect those interests

hased hiring policy"),

aff'd, 977F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam).

281. See, e. g ., Reed v. County of Casey, 184 F. 3 d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 1999) (sex-based BFOQ found

when state law required presence of female prison guard when female prisoner was lodged in jail and
transfer of female employee from first to third shift justified when no effective alternative existed due to

logistical complications and unpredictability of need); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d
697. 704-705 (8th Cir. 1 987) (sex-based BFOQ found when employer terminated unmarried, pregnant

female employee because primary p u r pose of organization was to serve as role model for teenage girls
and employee's contact with girls was inevitable).

2ll2. Beck v. Boeing Co. 60 Fed. Appx. 38, 4 (9th Cir. 2003).
283. Id.

284.

See

United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S.

285. See. e. g. ,

1 93 , 209 (1979).

id. at 208 (Title VII does not prohibit race-conscious affinan ti ve action polici es by

private sector employers taking steps to eradicate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated

joh categories); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 640 (1987) (agency was allowed to take
the employee's sex into account in determining her eligibility for promotion, as part of an affirmative
action plan for gradual improvement i n the representation of minorities and women i n the agency 's work
force ).

28 6. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).

287.

Id. at 73.
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employer liability for a hostile work environment created by supervisory

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton28 9
9
and Burlington Industrial v. Ellerth2 0 by holding that vicarious liability was the
employees.288 The Court resolved this issue in

appropriate standard for supervisory hostile work environment harassment.291
In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 29 2 the key issue before the Court was
whether an employer would be held strictly liable for a supervisor's conduct. The
Court found that Title VII holds employers liable for constructive discharge, but
that an e mployer is not always strictly liable.29 3 With regard to constructive
discharge, the Court's ruling in

Suders impacts the available employer defenses.

The Court made a distinction between a constructive discharge that is attributable
to a supervisor 's official conduct and one that is attributable to a supervisor's
unofficial conduct. If no official conduct is involved in the constructive
discharge, the employer may defend against such a claim by showing both:

1)

that it had installed a readily accessible and effective policy for reporting and
resolving complaints of sexual harassment, and
failed to

avail herself

of that

2) that the plaintiff unreasonably

employer-provided

preventive or

remedial

apparatus.294 This affirmative defense is not available to the employer, however,
if the plaintiff quits in reasonable response to an employer-sanctioned adverse
action officially changing her employment status or situation, for example, a
humiliating demotion, extreme cut in pay, or transfer to a position in which she

288. Goldsmith, supra note 1 92.
289. 524 U.S. 775 ( 1 998).
290. 524 U.S. 742 ( 1 998).
29 1 . See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 ( 1 998) (''We hold that an employer is
vicariously l iable for actionable discrimi nation caused by a supervisor, but subject to an affirmative
defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct as well as that of a plaintiff victim.");
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth , 524 U.S. 742, 765 ( 1 998). The Court stated:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile
environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the
employee. When no tangible employment action is taken. a defending employer may raise an
affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing beha; ior, and (b) that
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any prevent�ve or. corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise . . . " . No affirmative defense
is available, however, when the supervisor's harassment cul minates 111 a tangible employment
action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.

Id.
292. 542 U.S. 1 29 (2004).
293. Pennsylva nia State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 1 29, 2 1 6 (2004) ( The Court stated:
We conclude that an employer does not have recourse to the Ellcrth/Faragher affi i:m ative
_ �s
defense (which otherwise applies strict liability) when a superv isor's official act prec1p1tat
the constructive discharge; absent such a tangible employment action. however, the defense is
available to the employer whose supervisors are c harged with harassment. We therefore vacate
the Third Circuit's judgment and remand the case for further procecdmgs. ).
294. Suders, 542 U.S. at 2 1 2.
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would face unbearable working conditions.295 The Court also commented that if
the hostile work environment leads to a tangible employment action against the
employee, such as a reduction in pay, the employer cannot pursue the affirmative
defense.

296

5. Pretext
After the defendant employer has presented specific, non discriminatory
reasons for his conduct in a sex discrimination case, the plaintiff has the burden
of rebutting the employer' s evidence of a non discriminatory motive. If the

employer meets the burden of articulating a legitimate, non discriminatory
motive. the presumption of intentional discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff
can still prove d isparate treatment by, for instance, offering evidence demonstrat
ing that the employer's explanation is pretexual.297

In

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 298

the Court explained that

the j ury may find the ultimate fact of discrimination on a prohibited ground from

I ) evi dence making out a prima facie case, along with 2) "sufficient" evidence
that

the

employer's proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation is

fa l se . 299
When an employer asserts that he failed to hire an employee due to her lack of
qu a l i fi ca ti ons a comparative analysis o f other applicants for the same job may
,

help i n proving pretext. 300 The defendant can escape liability, however, if it
chooses an equally qualified applicant over another, barring any evidence of an
u n l awful motive.30 1

A showing of pretext is not just limited to final or formal

decision makers ; persons with actual, but not formal, decision-making authority

295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 50 n.3 (2003) (The Court stated:

The Court in McDonnell Douglas set forth a burden-shifting scheme for discriminatory
treatment cases. Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscrimina
tory reason for its employment action. If the employer meets this burden, the presumption of
intentional discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff can still prove disparate treatment by, for
instance, offering evidence demonstrating that the employer's explanation is pretextual.).
530 U.S. 133 (2000).
at 147 ("The fact finder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant, together with
the elements of the prima facie case, may suffice to show intentional discrimination [and a] rejection- of
the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrim ination") (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 5 1 1 (1993)).
:mo. See Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 1 8 6 F.3d 1 30 1 , 1 3 1 9 ( 1 0th Cir. 1 999) (quoting Sanchez
v . Phillip Morris, Inc., 992 F.2d 244, 247 (10th Cir. 1 993)) .
.\CH . See id. at 1 3 1 9 (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248-259 (1981)). The
.
between an unsuccessful candidate and a successful candidate must be "overwhelming" to be
differences
admine as evidence of pretext. Id. at 1 3 1 9 (quoting Sanchez v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 992 F.2d 244, 247-48
< I 0th Cir. 1 993)); see, e.g., Bullington, 1 86 F.3d at 1 3 1 9 (plaintiff alleged that other male applicants who
had sa�e q� alifications as she were hired for position she applied for and as such, United Air Lines was
d1scnmmatmg against her because she was, among other things, a woman).
298.

299. Id.

�
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can serve as the basis for proof that discrimination motivated the employment
decision. 302
6.

Plaintiff 's Ultimate Burden of Persuasion

The primary inquiry as to whether a claimant established a prima facie case
loses all importance once the defendant presents its proof. After both sides have
presented their cases, the jury has to evaluate all admitted evidence, including,
but not limited to, the plaintiff 's prima facie evidence to determine whether the
plaintiff carried the ultimate burden of persuasion. 303 A plaintiff has met her
burden of persuasion once she presents: I) a strong prima facie case and 2)
evidence that the defendant's proffered non-discriminatory motives for commit
ting the unlawful discriminatory practice are untrue.
B.

DISPARATE IMPACT

Compared to the widely used disparate treatment theory, Title VII plaintiffs
bring claims under the disparate impact theory much less frequently. 304 A Title
VII plaintiff invokes the disparate impact theory when asserting that a facially
neutral policy has a disproportionately adverse impact on a protected class. A
plaintiff alleging disparate impact does not have to show that the respondent
acted with discriminatory intent, because the purpose of the theory is to thwart
practices that disproportionately impact members of a protected class, where the
employer did not purposefully discriminate. 305 A complainant can invoke the

302.
stated:

See

Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 314 F.3d 657, 668 (4th Cir. 2003) (The court

In pretext cases our court and most other courts of appeals have rejected the view that the only
relevant decision makers are those with final or formal authority. These pretext cases support
the proposition that the discriminatory attitude of someone who is an actual, but not a fonnal,
decision maker may prove that discrimination motivated the employment decision.).
303. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 1 33, 146 (2000) ("The ultimate question is
whether the employer intentionally discriminated"). Once the defendant fails to persuade the court to
grant a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiff's case, and
defendant has offered evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the court should address the
ultimate discrimination vel non, and the question whether the claimant established a prima facie case is
no longer significant. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 7 1 1 , 716 ( 1 983).
304. See, e.g., Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What s
Griggs Still Good For? What Not ?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597 (2004)("Griggs and the disparate impact theory
of litigation remain largely untapped resources of enonnous potential for plaintiffs."); see also Nichole J.
Desario, Reconceptualizing Meritocracy: The Decline of Disparate Impact Discrimination Law, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 479, 480 (2003) ("Courts have chipped away at the premises of the disparate
impact doctrine . . . This dilution of the disparate impact doctrine is troubling in a society in which many
practices that disproportionately harm a protected class cannot neatly be traced to intentional
discrimination.").
305. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 40 1 U.S. 424, 43 1 (197 1 ); cf Candelario-Ramos v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 360 F.3d 53, 62 ( 1 st Cir. 2004) ("[A]n employer who provides different levels of
compensation for employees pursuant to a bona fide seniority system cannot be held liable under . . .
disparate impact . . . [because] plaintiffs must prove an intent to discriminate.").
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disparate impact theory to combat objective policies, such as standardized test
scores, 306 and subjective policies, such as decision makers' beliefs, 307 that
disproportionately affect the plaintiff's protected class.308 Disparate impact is
regarded as an effective mechanism u seful in eradicating employment policies

that l i m it (prospective) employee opportunity.309 The theory has regularly been

used to challenge height and weight requirements that disproportionately affect
members of a protected class.

I . Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case and Employer 's Defenses

A p l aintiff alleging that her employer's policies disparately impact her
protected class must only show that a "significantly discriminatory pattern"
results from the employer's facially neutral policies.310 Then the defendant
employer bears the burden of demonstrating that the contested policy has "a
manifest relationship to the employment in question."3 1 1 If the employer can
demonstrate that its business necessitates the policy or that the contested policy
relates to the defendant's business, then a court may uphold the policy; in making
such demonstration, the employer assumes the burden of production and
pcrsuas ion . 3 1 2 If the defendant employer makes such a showing, then to prevail,

1 ) do not
2) "serve the employer's legitimate

the plaintiff must show that other policies are available and the policies
simi l arly adversely impact the plaintiff, and

interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship."3 1 3

2 . Plaintiff Reliance o n Statistical Evidence
In m aking a prima facie case, a plaintiff does not have to use all available

306. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 ( 1 982) (Court found that a standardized test requisite
ac4uire supervisor status disproportionately impacted African American applicants).
307. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 ( 1988) (Court found that the
suhjccti ve views of individuals in a supervisory role may buttress disparate impact claims).
308. See id.
309. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 43 1 .
3 1 0. 4 2 U.S . C. § 2000e-(k) ( l )(A) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2); see also Griggs, 401 U.S.
at 430: Teal, 457 at 446 (plaintiff, as a member of a protected class, must shows that a facially neutral
employment practice significantly disproportionately impacted her as a member of such class).
3 1 1 . Griggs, 40 1 U.S. at 432.
3 1 2. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l )(A)(i) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2), amended by Civil
Rights Act of 1 99 1 , Pub. L. No. 1 02- 1 66, § 105(a), 1 05 Stat. 1 07 1 ( 1 99 1 ).
3 1 3. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 ( 1 975) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 4 1 1 U.S. 792, 801 ( 1 973) (The Court stated:
to

This burden arises, of course, only after the complaining party or class has made out a prima
facie case of discrimination, i.e., has shown that the tests in question select applicants for hire
or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants . . . If
an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests are 'job related,' it remains open
to the complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and
trustworthy workmanship' . . . . Such a showing would be evidence that the employer was
using its tests merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination . . . . In the present case, however, we are
concerned only with the question whether Albemarle has shown its tests to be job-related. )).
.
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evidence, but rather only evidence that "conspicuously demonstrates a job
requirement's grossly discriminatory impact. "3 14 As the disparate impact theory
relies heavily on employment policies' effects on individuals who belong to a
protected class,

plaintiffs invoking the disparate impact theory often use

statistical evidence to buttress their claims. 3 1 5 When using statistical evidence to
show a policy disparately impacted hiring, a plaintiff's evidence will not suffice if
she only compares members of the plaintiff's protected class to individuals who
do not belong to the plaintiff's protected class.3 1 6 Additionally, a plaintiff must

1)

proffer evidence comparing the proportion of protected class members that
applied for the contested position or similar positions to the proportion of class
members who received the position and

2) show how that data compares to

corresponding data of non-class members. 3 1 7 A complainant must also identify a
nexus between the allegedly discriminatory practices and the statistical dispari
ties evident in proffered data. 3 1 8 Statistical evidence need not incorporate all
variables that may affect the outcome of a statistical analysis supporting a
plaintiff's disparate impact claim.3 19 H owever, if relevant statistical analysis
lacks several substantial variables, then courts may find the analysis insufficient
20

to sustain a disparate impact claim. 3

C. GENDER NEUTRALITY, RACE, AND HETEROSEXISM: CHALLENGES FOR TITLE

VII

From the beginning, Title VII policy and jurisprudence has been challenged by
the realities of its normative concern for resolving difference and power
associated conflicts within a white, heterosexist context. The law has traditionally
conceived of gender identity in terms of heterosexual white women and racial

314. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977) (plaintiff proffered enough evidence to show
that defendant employer's height and weight requirements disparately impacted women in violation of
Title VU).
315. See generally B . SCHLEI & P. GROSMMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 91-92, 1389 ( 2d
ed. 1983).
316. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Though Congress expanded the
interpretation of the disparate impact doctrine in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Ward Cove still sufficiently
describes the proof required to make a disparate impact showing. However, a plaintiff cannot use
disparate impact to invalidate a §2000e-2(h) "bona fide seniority system" that allocates differing
compensation based upon employees' seniority ; the plaintiff must instead invoke the disparate treatment
doctrine. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 ( 1 982).
317. See Ward Cove, 490 U.S. at 642; see also Foster, 98 Fed. Appx. at 85.
318. Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 ( 1 988).
319. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
320. See Sandoval v. Boulder, 388 F.3d 1 312, 1326 (Colo. 2004) (A "conclusory observation that . . .
agencies . . . employ minorities and women in their upper ranks does not constitute ' statistical evidence '
that . . . challenged hiring practices sy stematically disadvantaged minorities and ".'o m�n.' '.) ; cf �ooper v.
S . Co., Ga. Power Co., 390 F.3d 695, 717-18 ( l l th Cir. 2004). In a Title VII racial d1scnmmat1on case,
after assessing the adequacy of the plaintiff's statistical report proffered to establish that employer's
policies disparately impacted African-Americans, the court affirmed the district court's .finding� that
evidence presented did not establish discrimination. Id. The c�urt noted the lack of d1fferen_tia_t10,n
between types of positions, locations of the plaintiffs, and pohc�es o_f _ departments and the plamt1ff s
failure to identify a policy or practice responsible for the alleged disparities. Id.
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identity in terms of heterosexual black men. Through this narrow and single-axis
framework the experiences and perspectives of women of color, homosexuals,
and transgendered persons are muted, if considered at all. When considering the
experiences of women of color and the growing reality of same sex sexual
harassment, the manner in which courts decide cases increasingly requires the
consideration of multiple and varied structures and experiences of subordination.
I

.

The Gender Neutral Approach and the Reasonable Woman Standard

The reasonable person standard is a foundational theory of American tort law;
courts have often referred to a hypothetical person 's behavior to measure what
conduct is reasonable and what is unreasonable. 32 1 Courts first establish that
Americans have a duty to act with reasonable and ordinary care and then evaluate
i f the particular plaintiffs and defendants have conducted themselves in such a
manner.322 After the Supreme Court established the sexual harassment claim
under Title VII, courts have evaluated plaintiffs' cases by asking if a reasonable
person would view the workplace in question as hostile. 323
As with other areas of tort law, courts have applied more specific standards
than the reasonable person standard when dealing with instances of mental
incompetence, children, and other extraordinary cases. 324 These situations reveal
the flaws in the belief in a "neutral" or "objective" standard that is not contingent
on a particular experience or perspective. With respect to sexual harassment law,
the reasonable woman standard is inadequate to the extent that it assumes a
monol ithic perspective on the experiences of women across race, class, and
religious differences in confronting gender discrimination in the workplace.325
The "reasonable person" standard does not take into account the differences

32 1 .

See. e.g., Bethel

v.

N.Y. City Transit Auth . , 703 N.E.2d 1 2 14, 1 2 1 6 (N.Y. 1 998) (defendant was

held to the ordinary standard of care instead of the heightened standard for a common carrier when its
faulty hus seat caused plaintiff's injury);

see also

Estate of Lepage v. Home, 809 A.2d 505, 5 1 1 (Conn.

2002 l (appropriate inquiry was whether a daycare provider fulfilled her duty of care to a baby who died of

sudden infant death syndrome).
322.

See,

e.g., Gordon v. Am. Museum of Natural History, 492 N.E. 2d 774 (N.Y. 1986) (museum was

not liable for violating the standard of care because it did not have constructive notice of a slip of paper
1hat caused the plaintiff to fall and injure himself).
323.

See

e n v i ro nment

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 7 8 7 ( 1 998) (to prevail on a hostile
claim, the alleged harassment "must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that

a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.").
_\ 24. See Roberts v. Ramsbottom, l All E. R. 7 (Q.B.D. 1 979) (defendant suffered stroke while driving

hut proceeded behind the wheel and was held liable for the damage caused by an ensuing crash; his
argument that he should be judged by a different standard for those with impaired facilities was
dismissed); Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 ( 1 837) (defendant was held liable for piling hay on
his own property despite warnings that it was a fire hazard when a blaze burned down his neighbor's
house ).

But see Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Wisc. 1996) (mentally
impaired individual's incapacity was taken into account in determining the appropriate standard of care);
Lcmuth v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 348 P.2d 887, 894 (Cal. 1 960) (upheld jury instructions
specifying that children should be held to a different standard of care than adults) .

325. See generally, Meri 0. Triades, Article: Finding a Hostile Work Environment: The Searchfor a
Reasonable Reasonableness Standard, 8 WASH . & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L. J. 35 (2002).
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between how men and women experience sexual behavior.326 Women are more
often the victims of sexual violence and rape, therefore conduct that may not
offend a man may offend a woman. This fundamental difference in world view
alters the manner in which basic communication is interpreted and relationships
are managed.
The "reasonable woman" standard was first used in a dissent in Rabidue v.
3
Osceola Re.fining Company. 27 The Ninth Circuit agreed, adopting the "reason
able woman" standard because "a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to
be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences of women . . .
[a] gender-conscious examination of sexual harassment enables women to
participate in the workplace on an equal footing with men."328
The "reasonable woman" standard is best explained through "differences
feminism or cultural feminism." According to this theory, law should promulgate
an "acceptance theory" embracing the differences between the sexes.329 Cultural
feminist would note that the "reasonable person" standard i s in actuality a
"reasonable man" standard that purports to embrace both sexes but is actually
only based on the male baseline of appropriate behavior. 330 The evolution of this
thinking is evident in the legal theory of Justice Ginsberg, who i n United States v.
Virginia33 1 revealed the evolution of her thinking on the recognition of gender
differences in the law. 332 While previously unsupportive of laws recognizing
gender differences, 333 Justice Ginsberg 's opinion stated, "inherent differences
between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for
celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial

326. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1 99 1 ) ( The court stated:
We believe that in evaluating the severity and pervasiveness of sexual harassment, we should
focus on the perspective of the victim. If we only examined whether a reasonable person would
engage in allegedl y harassing conduct, we would run the risk of reinforcing the prevail i n g level
of discrimination. Harassers could continue to harass merely hecausc a particu lar discrimina
tory practice was common, and victims of harassment would have no remedy. We therefore
prefer to analyze harassment from the victim"s perspective.

A complete

understanding of the

victim's view req uires, among other things. an analysis of the differcnl perspectives of men and
women. Conduct that many men consider unobjectionahle may offend many women.).
327. 805 F.2d 6 1 1 (6th Cir. 1 986) (C.J. Keith dissenting:

I would have courts adopt the perspective of the reasonahle victim which simultaneously
allows courts to consider salient sociological di fferences as well as shield employers from the
neurotic complainant. Moreover, unless the outlook of the reasonable woman is adopted, the
defendants as well as the courts are permitted to sustain ingrai ned notions of reasonable
behavior fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men. ) .
against a
328. See Ellison v . Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1 99 1 ) ( court upheld employee's claim
find such
sent her letters with sexual content because a reasonable woman would

man who

correspondence objectionable).

329. See generally, ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE ( 1 997).

330. See generally, CAROL GILLIAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE ( 1 983 ).
33 1 . 5 1 8 U.S. 5 1 5 ( 1 996).

332. Id. at 554.
333. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Gender and the Co11stiturio11. 44

U. C!N. L. REV. I ( l 975)

·
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constraints on an individual's opportunity."334 She goes on to observe a
reparative framework for gender justice, stating that sex differences can be used
to compensate women who have suffered economic disadvantages and to
promote equal employment opportunities.335 While education and employment
are di fferent fields, Ginsberg's comments in Virginia indicate the promise that a
more gender-conscious jurisprudence lies ahead in all fields of law.
The "reasonable woman" standard may hinder the cause of gender justice by
rcifying long held and deeply seated stereotypes about the differences between
the genders.336 "Formal" or "liberal" feminists hold the view that women are like
men in the ways that matter to the state and should be treated accordingly.337 This
view holds that the male standard is, in fact, neutral or will become so in time.338
Th is view has made its way into Supreme Court decisions.339
2. The Intersection of Race and Gender

Courts have recognized the interaction of multiple sources of discriminatory
an imus when considering the claims of women of color.340 Some courts
aggregate evidence of racial hostility with evidence of sexual hostility while
others deal with an adverse employment action based on two or more grounds
scparately.34 1 The experiences of women of color, and black women in particular,
in bri nging Title VII discrimination claims based on race and sex have been
dassi tied as "sex-plus" and a discrimination claim from a subclass of women
cannot be undermined by a showing of non-discriminatory treatment towards the
respective disaggregated classes of the subclass . 342 While the "sex-plus"
framework recognizes the unique discrimination black women face in the
workplace, it fails to recognize the indivisible nature of the discrimination caused
by their gender status and the discrimination caused by their racial status. These
identities are not severable or stackable, but rather they are experienced
simultaneously.

334. Vir}?inia, 5 1 8 U.S. at 533.
335. Id. at 533.
336. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 244 (1999); see also
Ginsburg. supra note 333 (gender distinctions harm women).
337. See BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 809 (2002); see generally, WFST,
mpra note 329.
338. See HOOKS, supra note 337; see generally, WEST, supra note 329.
339. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 1 90, 199 ( 1 976) (legislatures should adopt sex-neutral substantive
laws: sex-based distinctions, such as the one in the Oklahoma statute imposing a different drinking age
for hoys than for girls, are unconstitutional); see also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 7 1 , 75-76 (1971)
I invalidating sex and gender distinctions in the law).
340. See Mccowan v. All Star Maint., Inc., 273 F.3d 917, 925 n.9 ( 1 0th Cir. 2001 ).
34 1 . Compare Harrington v. Cleburne County Bd. of Educ., 25 1 F.3d 935-37 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2001 ) with
M cGo w an v. All Star Maint., Inc., 273 F.3d 91 7, 925 n.9 ( 1 0th Cir. 2001 ) .
."\42. See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 6 1 5 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 1980)
< when Title VII plaintiff alleges that employer discriminates against black females, fact that black males
and white females are not subject to discrimination is irrelevant and must not form any part of the basis
for a finding that employer did not discriminate against black female plaintiff).
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General Motors,343 five African-American women brought

suit against General Motors, alleging that the employer's seniority system
perpetuated the effects of past discrimination against black women. While
General Motors did not hire black women prior to

1964,

the court noted that

General Motors hired female employees for a number of years prior to the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of

1 964. 344 The

fact that General Motors hired

only white women did not matter to the court in evaluating the General Motors'
system of seniority. The court was unable to imagine that black women could
have experiences separate and uniquely different from those of white women or

black men. 345 This oversight frames the expansion of Title VII j urisprudence that
the "sex-plus" framework strives to achieve.
The complexities of j oint racial and gender classification are not just the

problems of black women. While not traditionally thought to be the concern of
Title VII, black men have also faced specific and unique discrimination in
employment settings. The statistical evidence of black male experiences in the
labor market proves that black men do not share in the privileges of maleness
enjoyed by their white counterparts.346 While each component of the black
women's subjugation is commonly recognized as a protected class, the unique
social position of black men is hard to conceptualize. When blackness is

343. De Graffenreid v. GM Assembly Div., 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
344.

Id.

at 483 (The court stated:

GM was free of unlawful discrimi nation against women in its hiring, seniority, and layoff
policies for the following reasons: ( 1 ) GM's reliance on provisions of Missouri law relating to
employment of women insulated it from charges of sex discrimination; (2) GM's seniority
system did not perpetuate past discrimination because GM had hired female workers before the
effective date of Title

VII;

and (3) assertions by plaintiffs that GM's illegal employment

practices actually deterred several plaintiffs from applying for employment between 1965 and
1967, amount to "conclusory allegations" which cannot support a valid claim to constructive
seniority or other relief under Title

VII.);

see also Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Law and Politics,

in DAVID

KAIRYS, ED., THE POLrflCS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 356-57 ( 1 998).
345.

See Degraffenreid v.

GM Assembly Div., 4 1 3 F. Supp. 1 42, 1 45 (E.D. Mo. 1 976).

As the Court has stated above, counsel for plaintiffs, and the Court's own research, have failed
to discover any case holdings which allow the creation of a new sub-category within Title

VII

that would generate such a new protected class of minorities. The legislative history
surrounding Title

Vil

does not indicate that the goal of the statute was to create a new

classification of "black women" who would have greater standing than, for example, a black
male. The prospect of the creation of new classes of protected minorities, governed only by the
mathematical principles of permutation and combination, clearly raises the prospect of opening
the hackneyed Pandora's box.
For a more in-depth discussion of the implications of this and other decisions on the construction of
in the courts, see Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrim ination Law and Politics, in DA VID KAIRYS, ED., THE Pouncs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE

Id.

black women's identity

CRITIQUE 356-57 ( 1998).
346.

.

See, e.g., Kenneth Couch & Mary C. Daley, Improving the Relative Status of Black Men, workmg

equally experienced
paper (January 2004) (In 2001 the average younger black earned 86% as much as his
whole).
a
as
men
white
of
wages
the
72%
earn
white counterpart. Black men as a whole
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combined with maleness, black men are completely separated from white men in
the labor market. 347
Few Title VII cases have recognized the unique status of black men. In
Jolm.wm v. Memphis Police Department,348 the court found for a plaintiff who
complained that the department's no beard policy discriminated against many
black men who, unlike white men, suffer from a skin condition that makes it
unhealthy to shave every day.349 In Robinson v. Adams,350 however, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the argument that a black man had established a prima facie case
of sex-and-race discrimination. 351 In light of cases like these a "race-plus"
framework has been proposed for helping courts comprehend the unique
discrim ination faced by black men.352 Furthermore, such a framework may help
illustrate that black men need not establish that their grievance is one common to
all black individuals working for a particular employer, but rather that the fact
that they are black and male, they have been singled out for prejudice.353
3 . S ame-Sex S exual Harassment

Sexual harassment law traditionally has been concerned with interactions
between men and women in the workplace. A growing number of sexual
harassment cases, however, occur between members of the same sex. Title VII
does not recognize sexual orientation as a classification and discrimination based
on sexual orientation is not actionable under Title VIl.354 While the Supreme
Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services355 held that same-sex sexual
harassment is an actionable claim under Title VII, the Court's language did not
resolve how pl aintiffs alleging same-sex sexual harassment prove that the
conduct was "because of sex. "356 Consequently, the lower courts employ
di ffering and conflicting methods of analysis to determine when and under what

347.

See, e.g., Jesse

REV. 749 ( 1 99 1 ).

B . Semple, Note:

Invisible Man: Black and Male Under Title VII, 1 04 HARV. L.

348. 7 1 3 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Tenn. 1989).

349.

Id. at 245.

35 1 .

Id. at (The Court stated:

350. 84 7 F.2d 13 1 5 (9th Cir. 1987),

cert. denied, 490 U .S. 1105 (1989).

Conceivably, the absence of any black male employees could result from racial stereotyping or
have some other link to racial discrimination . . . [The plaintiff's] showing that black males are
statistically underrepresented cannot, standing alone, show a racially discriminatory impact
when there is clearly no racially discriminatory impact on blacks as a whole.).
.l52.
353.

See Semple, supra note 347, at 765-67.
Id.

354. 42 U.S.C. 2000e (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2);
Specialists. 2004 W L 23 1 293 (E.D. P a. 2004).
355. 523 U . S. 75 ( 1 998).

see also A llen v. Mineral Fiber

See generally Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1 998). For a more
Price Waterhouse and
Gender Stereotyping Save the Day For Same-Sex Discrimination Plaintiffs Under Title VII? A Careful
Reading of Oncale Compels an Affirmative Answer, 3 2 SETON HALL L. REv. 455 (2002).
356.

in-depth discussion of the Oncale decision, see Matthew Fedor, Comment, Can
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circumstances plaintiffs alleging same-sex sexual harassment have a valid
claim.357
The Court articulated in

Oncale

that a plaintiff alleging same-sex sexual

harassment must prove that the discrimination was not just tinged with offensive
sexual connotations, but that it actually constituted discrimi nation "because of

sex."35 8 Prior to Oncale, the Court ruled on gender stereotyping
Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 359 In Price Waterhouse, the Court stated :

in

Price

As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day
when

an

employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting

that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for in
forbidding employers to discriminate agai nst individuals because of
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate

treatment of men and women res ulting from sex stereotypes. 36

The Court did not mention

Price Waterhouse

in

Oncale.

0

They have also

declined to hear lower court cases dealing with same-sex sexual harassment since

Oncale, leaving the lower courts with little guidance.

Consequently, a number of

conflicting approaches to addressing same-sex sexual harassment have been
used. For instance, in

Oncale

James

v.

Platte River Steel Ca.;16 1

the court held that the

decision's finding that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under

Title VII specifically dealt with same-sex sexual harassment tied to gender
discrimination and that since James could not show that the harassment he faced
was "because of. . . sex," he did not have a n actionable claim under Title VII. 36 2
Circuit court splits have left same-sex sexual harassment an unresolved issue.
The perspective of the lower courts fal l into four categories:
overlook Price

I)

courts that

Waterhouse and take a restrictive view o f the meaning of "sex," 2)

courts that equate gender stereotyping with sexual orientation discrimination,

3)

courts that recognize a gender stereotyping cause of action under Title VII but

357.

See generally Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Company, 260 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir. 200 1 ) ;

Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., 256 F. 3d 864 (9th Cir. 200 I ); Spearman v. Ford
(7th Cir.

2000); Higgins v. New Balance A thletic Shoe,

358.

Oncale, 523 U.S. at 8 1 .

360.

Id. at 251 (quotations omitted).

362.

Id. (The court stated:

Inc., 194 F.3d 252

Motor Co.,
( I st Cir. 1 999).

231 F.3d I 080

359. 490 U.S. 228 ( 1 989).

36 1 . 1 1 3 Fed. Appx. 864, 2004 WL 2378778 ( 1 0th Cir. 2004).
[Plaintiff's] arguments are without merit. Regardless of whether Platte River has a history of

employing male employees who sexually harass other male employees, [plaintiff) mus� sti l

!

establish that he was personally discriminated against because of his gender . . . while 11
certainly appears that the general work atmosphere at Platte River was awash with childish and

boorish behavior, (plaintiff) failed to put forth sufficient admissible evidence to establish, under

Oncale, that he was unlawfully discriminated against "because of sex" based on the general

work atmosphere at Platte River. We therefore reject (plaintiff)'s claim that the district court

erred by failing to consider other alleged incidents of male-on-male sexual harassment
involving other Platte River employees.).
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deny the particular claim and 4) courts that recognize a gender stereotyping cause
of action under Title VII but affirm the claim.363 The Supreme Court has denied
certiorari in many of the cases that fall into these categories. 364
In Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Company, 365 the court recognized
three ways in which a plaintiff can demonstrate that same-sex sexual harassment
amounted to discrimination because of sex: the harasser was motivated by sexual
desire, expressing hostility to the presence of a particular sex in the workplace, or
ac ting to punish the victim's noncompliance with gender stereotypes.366 Other
courts have used this framework to analyze same-sex sexual harassment cases
and sti l l found the evidence insufficient to support the claim.
The issues presented by the transformation of popular attitudes regarding
se xual ity and sexual orientation have brought lesser known aspects of Title VII
361
the Minnesota
i nto use. I n Thorson v. Billy Graham Evangelistic Association,
State Court of Appeals held that religious institutions and organizations can
proh i bit lesbians from positions o f employment.368 Title VII recognizes a
m i n isterial exception, insulating a religious organization's employment decisions
regarding its ministers from judicial scrutiny under Title VII. 369 While an existing
state statute was the ultimate standard upon which Thorson ' s claim was rejected,
the case i l l ustrates how the ministerial exception in Title VII can be used to
perpetuate discrimination against gays and lesbians.370
CONCLUSION

Same sex sexual harassment represents a new and contested frontier in sexual
harassment law specifically and sexual discrimination law generally. While the
courts recognize that same-sex conflicts are legitimate claims and will likely be
on

the rise in a more sexually aware society, they have yet to expand the

protections of Title VII fully to include same sex sexual harassment. The circuit
spl its on this issue, however, reveal that Title VII disparate treatment and sexual
harassment jurisprudence continue to develop in a manner Congress likely did
not anticipate i n

1 964. Ultimately Title VII must become an umbrella to protect

against conflicts arising in the workplace at the intersection of identity, sex, and
power.

363. See Fedor, supra note 356, at 468-69.
364. See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir. 200 1). cert.

denied, 534
U.S. 1 1 55 (2002); S pearman v. Ford Motor Co., 23 1 F.3d 1 080 (7th Cir. 2000) , cert. denied, 532 U.S. 995

< 200 1 ).

365. 260 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir. 200 1 ).
366.

Id. at 264.

367. 687 N.W.2d 652 (2004).
368. See Thorson v. Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass'n, 687 N.W.2d 652 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
369. 4 2 U.S.C. § 2000e (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2).
370. See Thorson, 687 N.W.2d 652.

